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BEYOND CASES: RECONSIDERING JUDICIAL REVIEW
JANET S. LINDGREN*
The continuing power of cases to confine the questions in law
and to limit the imagination that answers them is not easily broken.
Legal scholarship and law school curricula have proven remarkably
resilient to criticism that pushes beyond cases.' The tenacity of the
commitment to cases in mainstream scholarship and teaching lies in
the fact that cases are an integral part of a larger commitment to
liberal legal theory and the rationalization of a rule of law that it
requires.2 Judicial opinions are a natural resource within that enter-
* Professor of Law, Faculty of Law and Jurisprudence, State University of New York
at Buffalo. This study was supported by fellowships from the American Bar Foundation and
the Baldy Center for Law and Social Policy, State University of New York at Buffalo, and by
travel funds from the University Grants, State University of New York at Buffalo. I owe
particular thanks to Robert W. Gordon and Willard Hurst for their instigation and interest.
Jack Schlegel sustained faith in the search for detail. Ann Evanko assisted in the search.
1. By "legal scholarship" I mean to refer to "the mainstream elite scholarship of this
country, the work of the acknowledged intellectual leaders of the profession." Gordon, Histor-
icism in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1017, 1018 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Gordon, His-
toricism]. Tushnet, Legal Scholarship: Its Causes and Cure, 90 YALE L.J. 1205, 1207 & n.13
(1981) examined "the body of work now accepted as legal scholarship," by looking at signed
nonstudent writing in the law reviews of the "relatively elite schools in the hierarchy of legal
education."
The preference for cases is apparent in the relative inattention, in both scholarship and
education, to legislation-an obvious and clearly "legal" source. Relative inattention contin-
ues despite the fact that "[s]tatutory law is now the preponderant component of law-embodied
public policy." Hurst, Book Review, 67 MINN. L. REv. 536 (1982). Statutory law is in fact "a
pervasive element of twentieth century legal order in the United States." W. HURST, DEAL-
ING WITH STATUTES 1 (1982). The preponderance of legislation is often noted with hostility.
See G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAw FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982); G. GILMORE, THE AGES
OF AMERICAN LAw 95 (1977).
The push beyond cases has come from various authors. Those who have been particu-
larly important to my own understanding include Willard Hurst and Stewart Macaulay, both
of whom were my teachers, and Robert W. Gordon who was my colleague at Buffalo. See e.g.
Gordon, Historicism, supra this note; Gordon, Introduction: J. Willard Hurst and the Common
Law Tradition in American Legal Historiography, 10 LAw & SOC'Y REv. 9 (1975); Macaulay,
Private Legislation and the Duty to Read-Business Run by IBM Machine, The Law of Contracts
and Credit Cards, 19 VAND. L. REV. 1051 (1966); S. Macaulay, Law and Social Science-Is
there any There There? Mitchell Lecture, SUNY at Buffalo Law School (Apr. 7, 1983); W.
HURST, DEALING WITH STATUTES, supra this note; W. HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF
FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES (1956) [hereinafter cited as W.
HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM]; Hurst, Book Review, supra this note.
2. R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS passim, especially at 67-103 (1975); Gordon,
Historicism, supra note 1, at 1018-19; Horwitz, The Historical Contingency of the Role of His-
tory, 90 YALE L.J. 1057 (1981); Tushnet, supra note 1, at 1206-07.
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prise because their function is to rationalize judicial choice.3 The
current critique of mainstream scholarship and teaching tends to
strike first at the underlying theory. If these critics can change the
theory and thus the questions, the range of resources relevant to the
inquiry will change as well. The result will be a move beyond cases. I
start at the other end, countering a case-based view of an area of law
with an analysis based on resources beyond cases. My hope is that, if
what readers find in my work is inconsistent with the assumptions
they bring to their own work, they may reconsider the theory that
informs those assumptions and change the questions they ask.
The stubborn preference for work confined by cases goes beyond
their compatibility with dominant legal theory. It may in some
small part be the inheritance of a time when judicial decisions domi-
nated the legal landscape.4 More importantly, the preference may
be for the complete, bounded and ordered universe for inquiry that
the common law provides.5 Within that universe, cases serve all
needs. They provide the categories of thought, the terms of dis-
course and thus the questions; they serve as the evidence for answer-
ing the questions they define as important; they reassure, by their
declarations, that what appears in cases reflects or will reflect the
world beyond cases.6 Boundaries make thought manageable, if not
easy-an attraction that should not be underestimated. Finally, the
role that cases have played perpetuates recourse to cases. Cases
dominate the education of most recruits who begin to research and
teach law" and mark those who work beyond cases as outsiders.'
3. Kairys, Introduction, THE POLITICS OF LAW, A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 3 (D. Kairys
ed. 1982). While I argue that the structure imposed by cases remains at the core of legal
scholarship and legal education, we may well disagree about the strength and extent of its
hold. The hold may always have been weaker in some areas or the critics stronger.
4. The extent to which statutes were subordinate to common law in the early years of
the republic may be overestimated by scholars used to working from cases. G. CALABRESI,
supra note 1, at 183 n.1 (accompanying ch. 1, "Choking on Statutes").
5. The universe is carefully indexed as well, and thus seems to allow easy access to its
substance. By comparison to West's rational ordering of the legal universe, legislation is an
often unpredictable agglomeration of material.
6. Gordon, Historicism, supra note 1; and Kairys, supra note 3, at 4.
7. Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Norma-
tive Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1105-06 (1981) turns to our "professional-
ization and profession" to explain why constitutional scholarship is so case centered. Legal
scholars, who were once law students, were almost certainly introduced to the law through the
opinions of appellate courts. For the most part, that practice still continues. Mastery of the
judicial opinion identifies one as an initiate. Mastery, once achieved, is not likely to be lightly
surrendered, particularly when that which has been mastered appears orderly and rational.
Those same scholars are likely to have clerked for judges. As clerks, they then shared in "the
power of judicial decision" and "aspir[ed] to our adopted fathers' seats." Id. at 1106.
8. The perception of being defined as an outsider is painfully clear in Tushnet, supra
note 1, at 1207 & n.14.
Beyond Cases
Saying that the security and familiarity of cases reinforce the incli-
nation to work within cases will not eliminate the urge for security
and familiarity. Articulating this may, however, help a reader un-
derstand why the boundary marked by cases often feels more like a
cliff than a fence.
The study of judicial review presented here is both an argument
for different questions in constitutional law and an example support-
ing the more general proposition that cases continue to control our
inquiries. On both levels, a division of labor should be understood. I
do not expect a careful study of due process judicial review in New
York in the fifty years between 1870 and 1920 to dismantle the pre-
vailing understanding of judicial review, much less constructs in
other areas that are built out of cases. I do expect to facilitate doubt
about such constructs-to encourage questions that do not accept
the assumptions in the cases and that look beyond the cases for the
answers. I turn to constitutional law, hoping others will question the
extent to which cases confine the important issues and the possible
answers in other areas.
I. CASE CONSTRUCTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE OPPOSITION
OF COURT AND LEGISLATURE
It is understood in the literature on judicial review that in de-
claring statutes unconstitutional the courts act in opposition to the
will of a formally representative legislature. This understanding
grows out of the judicial negation of legislative choice and survives
because the opinions that negate the statutes are also the basis for
inquiry about the process. In those opinions the judges write as if
the process of determining constitutional content necessarily ends
with judicial review; working within those opinions constitutional
scholars struggle to reconcile constitutional adjudication and demo-
cratic theory. The relationship between court and legislature looks
very different when inquiry is taken beyond cases to subsequent leg-
islation and social context; as the relationship between court and
legislature changes, so do the important questions.
Evidence of what is "understood" about judicial review can be
hard to come by-premises have a way of disappearing from discus-
sion and thus from scrutiny. Fortunately, those who attempt com-
prehensive theories within an area find it necessary to unearth basic
assumptions as they identify the settled ground on which they can
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build. In their theories of judicial review, Ely and Choper present
the opposition of court and legislature and the dominance of the
courts within that opposition as settled.9 They see the relation of
court and legislature in a democracy as the central problem in con-
stitutional adjudication, and their theories are meant to resolve it.
Ely is clearest about the problem:
When a court invalidates an act of the political branches on constitu-
tional grounds . . . it is overruling their judgment, and normally doing
so in a way that is not subject to "correction" by the ordinary lawmak-
ing process. Thus the central function, and it is at the same time the
central problem, of judicial review: a body that is not elected or other-
wise politically responsible in any significant way is telling the people's
elected representatives that they cannot govern as they'd like. 1
0
That message is not much softened by the fact that, years later, the
court may change its position.1 '
Judicial opposition to legislative choice is not particularly prob-
lematic when judicial choices closely reflect choices built into the
terms of the Constitution for then it can be translated into the oppo-
sition of legislature and constitution.' 2 It is when the judges invali-
date legislative choices under open-ended constitutional provisions
that judicial opposition to legislative choice is assumed to create
problems in a democracy.' 3 Then the choices of elected, and thus
9. J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 132 (1980); J.
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIsTRusT; A THEORY OF JuDcIAL REVIEW 4-5 (1980).
10. J. ELY, supra note 9. Accord J. CHOPER, supra note 9, at 129-33. See, e.g., G. CALA-
BRESI, upra note 1, at 4.
11. The study presented here is of decisions made under substantive due process doc-
trine. The courts eventually changed their treatment of due process claims, but not before
most of the interactions traced here had already occurred. The one interaction that reflected a
change in the underlying legal rule invaoved the substantial repassage in 1913 of an 1899 stat-
ute prohibiting women's night work. See infra notes 129-35 and accompanying text.
There is, of course, always the possibility of constitutional amendment, but that does
not seem to be considered part of the ordinary lawmaking process. The possibility of constitu-
tional amendment has not diminished the dilemma of judicial opposition to legislative choice.
12. Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American Revolu-
tionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REv. 843, 844 (1978).
13. Two symposia and numerous other articles have focused on this issue since the
publication of J. ELY'S book, supra note 9. Symposium: Constitutional Adjudication and Demo-
cratic Theory, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 259 (1981) (Estreicher, Review Essay, Platonic Guardians of
Democracy: John Hart Ely's Role for the Supreme Court in the Constitution's Open Texture,
supra this note, at 547 n.4, gathers a large number of articles written on this subject); Sympo-
sium: Judicial Review versus Democracy, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1981). Richards, Introduction to
Symposium: Constitutional Adjudication and Democratic Theory, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 276, 276
(1981) sees "a major renaissance of serious constitutional theory, which must be seen in the
perspective of a rebirth of interest in political theory and moral philosophy." Wellington, The
Nature of Judicial Review, 91 YALE L.J. 486, 486-87 (1982) observes that "the attempt to find
a justification for judicial review is again engaging the attention of several of our prominent
constitutional scholars, even as it did an earlier generation some twenty years ago."
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formally representative, legislators are opposed by choices left
largely open by the Constitution and made by judges who are sel-
dom considered representative, even when elected. 4 A legacy of ju-
dicial domination survives the reconciliations that may occur when
the same judges change their minds, or the membership of the court
eventually changes. 5
The assumption that the process of constitutional choice neces-
sarily stops with judicial review is shared by writers who assign the
courts a special protective role because of that assumption and by
those who strain to limit the choices of the courts because of doubts
about the legitimacy of judicial choice.' 6 Scholars in both camps ac-
cept the assumption because both sides practice scholarship within
the confines of judicial opinions.' The result is constitutional in-
quiry largely limited to the opinions of the judges who decide the
cases, to the lives of those judges, and to the history of notable cases.
The tone of the opinions and the reactions of litigants reinforce those
14. The fact that New York's judges were elected for terms of 14 years in at least the
highest court, does not seem to have tempered the assumption that the New York courts
acted in opposition to the will of the people. D. EATON, SHOULD JUDGES BE EL,=TED? OR THE
EXPERIMENT OF AN ELECTIvE JUDICIARY IN NEW YORK 38-43 (1873) surveys the reason why
the people will not use elections of judges to express their will effectively.
15. E.g., as described in Brest, supra note 7, at 1085-86.
16. The former tend toward arguments that are not closely tied to the language of the
Constitution; the latter tend toward arguments based on textual interpretation of the written
Constitution. Thomas Grey sketched this basic division between "interpretivism" and
"noninterpretivism" in Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703
(1975). The division has served as the basic framework for discussion since. It is usefully re-
stated by Perry, Noninterpretive Review in Human Rights Cases: A Functional Justification, 56
N.Y.U. L. REv. 278, 278-80 (1981) and by J. ELY, supra note 9, at 1-2.
17. The prevalence of scholarly concern with judges prevailing in their opposition to
legislative choice is in sharp contrast to the rare willingness to recognize areas in which the
opposition is not problematic. Three authors reduce the area in which the opposition of judi-
cial and legislative choice needs to be addressed and suggest why judicial decisions that are
final are not particularly troublesome. Gibbons, Keynote Address, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 260, 266
(1981) notes that, "[if we eliminate statutory supremacy, the commerce clause, and inter-
state umpiring from our discussion, the area of potential dispute over the black art of judicial
review is considerably narrowed."
Perry, supra note 16, bases his functional justification for review in human rights cases,
which goes beyond purported interpretation of constitutional provisions, on a dialogue be-
tween court and legislature. In his view, the courts provide a moral critique and the possibility
of moral growth beyond established moral conventions: "The relation between noninterpreta-
tive review and electorally accountable policymaking is dialectical." Id. at 307. Protection
from judicial fallibility lies, he suggests, in the legislature's ability to limit the court's jurisdic-
tion. Id. at 331.
Wellington, supra note 13, at 504-08, challenges the finality of all but "the most sub-
stantive of constitutional cases." He minimizes the problem of finality in those by adding
that, "[i]n the most substantive of constitutional cases there is always doubt about finality at
the time of decision because there is always the possibility of judicial mistake and the inevita-
bility of social change." Id. at 508.
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limits. The opinions, written to counter the legislature's choice,
often scorn that choice: "No one will have the temerity to suggest
that this drastic and cumbersome statute is not in restraint of the
rights of 'liberty' and 'property' . .. 18 The initial reaction of
proponents of a statute declared unconstitutional is likely to confirm
the sense that the process of constitutional choice ends with judicial
review. That reaction can be harsh given the frustration of immedi-
ate goals and the fear that both the immediate goal and the broader
plan are forever lost.' 9 Respecting the boundaries of the written
opinion, scholars have not often gone on to ask what happened
next.2 °
18. Wright v. Hart, 182 N.Y. 330, 335, 75 N.E. 404, 406 (1905). The tendency to take
at face value what appears in judicial opinions is apparent in what Benjamin Twiss calls "law-
yer's history. . . . [It] proceeds, generally speaking, on the assumption that anything said in
a judicial decision which it is convenient to treat as authentic fact is authentic fact, whatever
a competent historical scholar might have to say about the matter." B. TwIss, LAWYERS AND
THE CONSTITUTION 147 (1962).
19. The anger was there in the period studied. Labor demonstrated. Notes of Current
Topics: Labor and the Judiciary, 42 AM. L. REv. 598 (1908). Reformers condemned. F. KEL-
LEY, SOME ETHICAL GAINS THROUGH LEGISLATION 231 (1905). Some lawyers roundly criti-
cized the courts. A.H.R., Coram non judice. Arousing the Public Mind Against the Judicial
Prerogative to Determine the Constitutionality of Legislation, 75 CENT. L.J. 229 (1912); McDon-
ough, The Courts and the Constitution, 84 CENT. L.J. 321, 322 (1917); P. Tecumseh Sherman,
Col. Roosevelt and Court Decisions, in BETTs-ROOSEVELT LETTERS---A SPIRITED DISCUSSION
93 (1912). The question here is not the existence of anger or the reasons for it, but what schol-
ars have made of it.
20. This single-minded concentration on the judicial opinion as both the object of criti-
cism and the source of information about the consequences of the opinion is epitomized by 0.
FIELD, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF LEGISLATION IN TEN SELECTED STATES (1943) and Field, Uncon-
stitutional Legislation by Congress, 39 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 54 (1945). The Works Project Ad-
ministration, the Graduate School Research Fund of Indiana University, the Social Science
Research Council and the Graduate School of the University of Minnesota all helped support
the state study. Field and his staff carefully combed all cases from each of 10 states to find the
decisions of unconstitutionality: "Over two millions of pages were examined in the course of
the project." 0. FIELD, supra this note, at 7. A questionnaire with 43 items was to have been
prepared for each case that held legislation unconstitutional. Id. at 5-7. Of the 43 questions,
all but three were to be answered from the opinion itself. Number 27 asked whether the case
had been overruled by any later case and sent the researcher to Shepard's citator. Question 25
asked: "Was any other law on this subject enacted in the following ten years? Check session
laws of state," and number 26 followed up with: "Does it seem to relate to parties or decision
in this case?"
In his description of their findings, Field tells us about the incidence of judicial review,
the parties in these cases, the forms of action used, the length of time between enactment of a
statute and its invalidation, the constitutional provisions relied on, the appearance of dissent-
ing opinions, the length of the judicial opinions and the rate of judicial reversal. Nowhere does
the discussion even edge toward the possibility that the legislature may have responded to a
judicial decision of unconstitutionality. It is as though questions 25 and 26 had never been
asked. In all probability they were never answered on the questionnaire, for given the compre-
hensiveness of the report an answer, whether affirmative or negative, would have been tallied.
The Field study is revealing not only as an example of case-confined vision but also
because it purports to expand on the usual study of cases: "Emphasis should be placed, here,
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The common law nature of scholarship insulates the assump-
tion that the process of contitutional choice necessarily ends when
the courts oppose legislative choice.2" Accepted wisdom within an
area is built incrementally. Participation within an area of scholar-
ship requires sharing some settled ground; debate is over unsettled
questions at the margins.2 2 The accumulation of scholarly writing
on judicial review that assumes that the courts prevail when they
oppose legislative choice is enormous, and the reputation of the
builders is often substantial. Their understanding that the constitu-
tional ultimatums of judges oppose and control the choices of
elected officials has made the legitimacy of judicial choice their ma-
jor concern.23 There have been reminders that this core assumption
on the fact that this is not a study of legal rules or principles as such. It is a fact-study, as the
modernists sometimes term this type of analysis." Id. at 10. In that expansive mood, the work
still stayed firmly bounded by the judicial opinion.
21. The tendency of judges to stress prior similar decisions to justify their choices gives
the impression that the choice being justified is a common one. Repetition of assertions about
the opposition of court and legislature likewise helps produce the "common understanding" I
am describing. Charles Warren in Warren, The Progressiveness of the United States Supreme
Court, 13 COLUM. L. REV. 294 (1913), recognized that "[t]here is grave danger that through
constant iteration the truth of this charge [of judicial oligarchy and judicial usurpation] will be
assumed, and that the discussion will be confined to the form of remedy needed." Id. at 294.
22. Parker, The Past of Constitutional Theory-and its Future, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 223
.(1981) calls for constitutional scholars in the "generation of the 1960's" to set their own terms
for constitutional discourse:
My appeal is this: Our elders have brought constitutional theory to a crossroads. Out
of their experience of life in our polity, they have conceived the problems of its consti-
tution in their own way. As a generation, we have had a rather different experience of
life in our polity. Therefore, it is given to us to conceive the problems of its constitu-
tion in a new way.
Id. at 223. Perry, supra note 16, seems to do that for he clearly works from core assumptions
that are not standard-i.e., judicial review is "an enterprise designed to enable the American
polity to live out its commitment to an ever deepening moral understanding and to political
practices that harmonize with that understanding." Id. at 294. Brest, supra note 7, at 1063,
describes the whole controversy "over the . . . legitimacy of normative constitutional schol-
arship [as] essentially incoherent and unresolvable." He briefly suggests "some alternative
strategies." Id. at 1109.
23. "[Tihe search for some coherent foundation for rights analysis, particularly for judi-
cial review, has been the preoccupation of modern constitutional law theorists." Mensch, The
History of Mainstream Legal Thought, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE,
supra note 3, at 34.
Grey, supra note 16, at 716, describes the use of "unwritten constitutional law" in the
late nineteenth century as "protecting 'liberty of contract' against labor regulation, and re-
straining taxation and the regulation of prices charged by private business. The reaction to
this tendency marked the beginning of sustained intellectual and political attack on the whole
concept of unwritten constitutional principles." Id. Belz surveys the attackers in detail in
Belz, The Realist Critique of Constitutionalism in the Era of Reform, 15 Am. J. LEGAL HIST. 288
(1971). He notes that, "[tihe burden of the constitutional realist critique was that courts
usurped the power of popularly elected legislatures in their irresponsible exercise of the review
function." Id. at 290.
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
may be in error, but the reminders have been tentative and more
often from disciplines other than law.24 The reminders have not
been sufficient to reshape the questions for constitutional
scholarship.
Those who venture beyond the pages of the opinions face rela-
tively unfamiliar ground, but the consequences of the move are sig-
nificant. This study of the relationship of court and legislature in
determining constitutional content goes beyond the judicial review
opinions. Substantive due process opinions from New Y ork at the
turn of the century were selected as a starting point because they
seemed particularly likely to confirm the usual understanding of
court opposed to legislature, with the courts winning. Finding and
then following each of those decisions establishes that for New York,
between 1870 and 1920, the common understanding about judicial
review is wrong. During this period it was the interaction between
New York's courts and legislature-not judicial ultimatum-that
determined constitutional content, and within that interaction it
Levy, Judicial Review, History and Democracy: An Introduction, in JUDICIAL REVIEW
AND THE SUPREME COURT (L. Levy ed. 1967) traces the argument that judicial review is con-
sistent with a democratic form of government, id. at 24-42; and the argument that it is con-
trary to democratic government, id. at 12-24. He describes the case for the democratic charac-
ter of judicial review as "certainly a compelling one-although not a convincing one." Id. at
24. Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HARv. L. REV. 193 (1952) takes
the distinctly minority position that legitimacy is not a problem: "[D]emocracies need not
elect all the officers who exercise crucial authority in the name of the voters." Id. at 197.
24. Hurst, Review and the Distribution of National Powers, in E. CAHN, SUPREME COURT
AND SUPREME LAW 140, 146-47, 152 (1954) observes that:
[T]he main thing that strikes the eye is how few the instances [of judicial invalidation
of statutes] are in relation to the great volume of congressional legislation, and sec-
ondly what a rag bag of miscellaneous items they are, the bulk of them obviously of
secondary importance.
As one looks at the responses . . . of the past seventy-five years, it is hard to
list examples of any strongly desired action which was not taken because of barriers
assumed to exist in judicial doctrine.
H. COMMAGER, MAJORITY RULE AND MINORITY RIGHTS 47 (1943) asserts that:
It is safe to say that had there never been an instance of judicial nullification of a
congressional act, our constitutional system would be essentially the same as it is
today. For most of the judicial nullifications of federal legislation have been cancelled
out by amendment, by new-and more acceptable-legislation, or, more frequently,
by judicial reversal.
Dahl, Decisionmaking in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J.
PUB. L. 279, 291 (1957) concludes, after detailed study of federal legislation that, "the elabo-
rate 'democratic' rationalizations of the Court's defenders and the hostility of its 'democratic'
critics are largely irrelevant, for lawmaking majorities generally have had their way." See also
W.C. GILBERT, PROVISIONS OF FEDERAL LAW HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL BY THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 87-95, 135-37 (1936); M. NELSON, A STUDY OF JUDICIAL RE-
VIEW IN VIRGINIA 1878-1928 (1947); Brown, Due Process, Police Power and the Supreme Court,
40 HARV. L. REV. 943 (1927).
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was the legislature, so often pictured at the mercy of the courts, that
tended to dominate.
If this interaction is repeated elsewhere, we need to determine
its contours and its contribution to theories of constitutional choice.
To the extent we can shake the assumption that the process of con-
stitutional choice necessarily ends when the courts oppose legisla-
tive choice, we can move from endless arguments about the legiti-
macy of judicial choice in a democracy to thinking more about, and
arguing more about, the competing values that underlie constitu-
tional choice.
II. QUESTIONING CASE CONSTRUCTS: DUE PROCESS JUDICIAL
REVIEW IN NEW YORK, 1870-1920
Generalization will not do in questioning the common wisdom
that the process of constitutional choice ends when the courts op-
pose legislative choice. Detail is needed to persuade that this as-
sumption of opposition must be rethought. That detail is provided
in this article for judicial review in New York in the years between
1870 and 1920. The possibility that the interaction found there be-
tween court and legislature was real, but an aberration, is twice min-
imized: first, by choosing to work with substantive due process
cases, where the assumption of opposition is particularly strong, and
second, by establishing that interaction in these cases continued an
existing relationship of interaction between court and legislature.
A. Setting the Study
The common understanding about the exercise of judicial re-
view in the period 1870-1920 has been, and continues to be, that it
was substantial, destructive, political and final-'"a massive judicial
entry into the socioeconomic scene, '' 25 a "carnival of unconstitu-
tionality,"26 personal judicial preference for laissez-faire capitalism
imposed under constitutional provisions too broad to constrain
choice.2 7 "The courts .. . invalidated or emasculated almost all
forms of federal social legislation between 1885 and 1935. . . .[It
25. A. PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE OF LAW: ATTITUDES OF BAR AND
BENCH, 1887-1895, at 2 (1969).
26. Pound, The Growth of Administrative Justice, 2 Wis. L. REV. 327 (1922-24).
27. A member of the Cigar Makers' International Union No. 27 in Brooklyn captured
the political nature of the court decisions: "Everything is unconstitutional that will mitigate
the burden of life to the wage-worker." BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, THIRTEENTH ANNUAL
REPORT FOR 1895, at 342 (1896).
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was] the fifty years' massacre." 2 It was "the most controversial
phase in our history of unwritten constitutional law."2 9 These are
the years in which this study is set.
Judges at the turn of the century fashioned the guarantee that
no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property with-
out due process of law"3 into a judicial review of the substance of
legislative choice.31 The judges of that period are credited with con-
structing barriers to legislative reform out of the due process
clause-barriers that held, at least until the judges chose to remove
them.3 2 "[It was a fortunate and relatively innocuous piece of re-
form legislation that was able to run the gauntlet of the due process
clause." 3 3 It is due process decisions that are studied here.
State courts led in the development of substantive due process
doctrine,34 and among those courts New York's are considered pre-
eminent in setting their own preferences over those of the legisla-
ture:3 5 "Of the state courts which influenced the development of
constitutional laissez-faire during the last thirty years of the nine-
teenth century none was more important than the New York Court
of Appeals." 36 New York is the site of this study.
28. Cohen, Field Theory and Judicial Logic, 59 YALE L.J. 238, 244-45 (1950).
29. Grey, supra note 16, at 716.
30. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
31. The courts decided "the just exactions and demands of the state." Bertholf v.
O'Reilly, 74 N.Y. 509, 515 (1878).
Under the mere guise of police regulations, personal rights and private property can-
not be arbitrarily invaded, and the determination of the legislature is not final or
conclusive. If it passes an act ostensibly for the public health, and thereby destroys
or takes away the property of a citizen, or interferes with his personal liberty, then it
is for the courts to scrutinize the act and see whether it really relates to and is conve-
nient and appropriate to promote the public health.
In re Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98, 110 (1885).
32. Cushman, The Social and Economic Interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, 20
MICH. L. REV. 737 (1922) reflects the common assumption about the division of labor between
court and legislature: "On this question of opinion [of the arbitrariness of workmen's compen-
sation or minimum wage laws] the legislature in enacting the law has the first word, while the
courts in deciding whether the law is constitutional have the last word." Id. at 738.
33. R. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 50 (1941). He characterizes
the Supreme Court "at the threshold of the New Deal . . . as a Supreme Censor of legisla-
tion." Id. at 70. See also Cushman, supra note 32, who characterizes the period as one in which
the courts "ruthlessly overrode the determinations of the legislature that social and economic
conditions justified and demanded legislative regulation." Id. at 753.
34. C. JACOBS, LAW WRITERS AND THE COURTS 92-93 (1954); Haines, Implied Limita-
tions on Legislatures, 3 TEx. L. REV. 1, 19 (1924).
35. A. PAUL, supra note 25, at 99-100; Corwin, The Extension of Judicial Review in New
York: 1783-1905, 15 MICH. L. REV. 281 (1917).
36. C. JACOBS, supra note 34, at 42.
592
Beyond Cases
B. Connecting the Study: Prior Interactions
The nature of the problems of a period influences the sort of
legislation required and in turn the task of the courts in evaluating
its constitutionality. Legislators and judges in 1870 through 1920
shared with businessmen, laborers, immigrants and reformers the
experience of often dismaying change. This was a period of increas-
ing industrialization, increasingly urban populations and increasing
fluctuations in economic cycles. Even the nature of sin was chang-
ing." As Willard Hurst put it, "events ran away with us after
1870 .. *"38 Certainty, security and familiarity were in relatively
short supply, though, to obtain these, businesses organized and com-
bined and laborers formed unions. Robert Wiebe describes the time
as "a search for order."39 The legislature increasingly moved away
from special legislation toward general legislation,4 ° and the courts
in turn moved from reviewing the form of special legislation toward
evaluating the content of general legislation.4 1 The form of the stat-
utes changed the nature of the questions for the courts, but the exis-
tence of interaction between court and legislature in determining
constitutionally acceptable solutions did not change.
The ad hoc solutions found in the private or local bills so famil-
iar at the beginning of this period were inadequate to meet increas-
ingly complex problems. New York's legislature, for example, at-
tempted through special legislation to salvage various railroad,
street car, elevated and subway lines that had earlier been chartered
by private bill, but found itself no closer to the coherent transporta-
tion network that was needed.4 2 This failure warned of the pitfalls
37. E. Ross, SIN AND SOCIETY, AN ANALYSIS OF LATTER DAY INIQUITY (1907).
38. W. HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM, supra note 1, at 84.
39. R. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER 1877-1920 (1967).
40. W. HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 66 (1950).
41. See infra note 53. In determining whether a statute was special, the judges asked
questions quite similar to those asked in determining whether a statute deprived a party of
property without due process of law. There was such a deprivation when a statute was passed
for the benefit of special classes rather than for the public. See Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133,
137 (1894) ("To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it
must appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require such interference;..."); Colon v. Lisk, 153 N.Y. 188, 47 N.E. 302
(1897).
42. These statutes illustrate the range of transportation problems for which solutions
were attempted by special legislation. In passing Act of June 22, 1880, ch. 577, 1880 N.Y.
Laws 866 (declared unconstitutional in Farnham v. Benedict, 107 N.Y. 159, 13 N.E. 784
(1887)), the legislature attempted to release the Attica and Arcade Railroad Company from
the forfeiture of its charter for failing to begin construction and to expend 10% of its capital
within five years. Act of Apr. 19, 1870, ch. 282, 1870 N.Y. Laws 634 (declared unconstitu-
tional in People ex rel. Dunkirk, W. & P.R.R. v. Batchellor, 53 N.Y. 128 (1873)) replaced a
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of using special legislation to solve general problems. The 1874 New
York Constitution reinforced the message by prohibiting special leg-
islation on a long list of subjects. These included, "[g]ranting to any
private corporation, association or individual any exclusive privi-
lege, immunity or franchise whatever."43 The legislature was in-
structed instead to "pass general laws providing for the cases enu-
merated in this section, and for all other cases which in its judgment,
may be provided for by general laws." 44 Private and local bills,
when appropriate, still could not embrace more than one subject,
which had to be expressed in the title.45
Nearly half the statutes declared unconstitutional between
1870 and 1885 failed because they were not in proper form for special
legislation or because they were special legislation on a topic that
had to be treated generally. When statutes were invalidated on
these grounds, the New York constitution literally invited legisla-
tive response.
The resulting interaction between court and legislature is ap-
parent in their initial exchange on the subject of tenement manufac-
ture. A statute passed in 1883 was local to New York City and pro-
hibited in its first section, "[t]he manufacture of cigars, or
preparation of tobacco in any form, in any rooms or apartments
which, in the City of New York, are used as dwellings, for the pur-
pose of living, sleeping or doing any household work. .. "46 The
second section prohibited dwelling in "any section of any floor in any
tenement house in the City of New York, in which the manufacture
of cigars or the preparation of tobacco is carried on. . . ."" The
statute that made it legal for the supervisor of any town through which the Dunkirk, Warren
and Pittsburgh Railroad ran to borrow or to bond up to a certain amount once the owners of
half the value of property in town consented, with a statute that required the supervisor to do
so. Act of May 2, 1878, ch. 206, 1878 N.Y. Laws 264 (declared unconstitutional in In re
Brooklyn, W. & N. R.R., 75 N.Y. 335 (1878)) amended an earlier statute to give the Brook-
lyn, Winfield and Newtown Railroad Company five years from the date of the second act to
begin construction.
43. N.Y. CONST. of 1846 art. III, § 18 (1874). Field, The New York Session Laws of 1892,
47 ALB. L.J. 90, 90 (1893) read this constitutional provision to "indicate the desire of the
people to drive special and local legislation from the Senate and Assembly." He decried not
only the economic cost of this sort of legislating (at an average cost of $734 per statute) but
also the potential social cost. "[An endless maze of regulations] would be socialism, not inter-
mittent but perpetual." Id. L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 305 (1973) describes
similar provisions in the constitutions of other states and attributes these restrictions on legis-
lative power to "fear of gross economic power, so gross it could buy and sell an upper and
lower house."
44. N.Y. CONST. of 1846 art. III, § 18 (1874).
45. N.Y. CONST. of 1846 art. III, § 16.
46. Act of Mar. 12, 1883, ch. 93, 1883 N.Y. Laws 79.
47. Id.
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title did not mention the second provision, the prohibition on dwell-
ing in a tenement in which cigars were manufactured.48 The title
described the Act only as one "to improve the public health in the
City of New York by prohibiting the manufacture of cigars and
preparation of tobacco in any form in the tenement-houses of said
city."4 9 The New York Court of Appeals held the statute unconsti-
tutional because "[t]he citizens of New York, jealous of interference
with their homes, reading the title of this bill, would be deceived,
misled, and thrown off their guard." 5 The legislature responded the
following year by passing a cigarmaking statute that was general in
form. It applied to cities having "over five hundred thousand inhab-
itants," 5 and thus avoided the technical title requirements for spe-
cial legislation on which its predecessor had floundered. The limita-
tions of the statute were extended to Brooklyn, the only other city of
that size. The statute inched toward the constitutionally preferred
generality.5 2
Throughout this period, the mix of special and general legisla-
tion continued to shift toward generality. This growing body of gen-
eral laws produced a constitutional exchange between legislature
and court that went beyond questions of form. The dialogue
changed from one predominantly about the adequacy of the general-
ity of legislation to one about the appropriate content of formally
general legislation. Thus, after 1896, only a few statutes were held
unconstitutional on the grounds that they were special legislation
either on prohibited topics or in improper form.5 3 The legislature
and the courts had turned their attention to questions of the proper
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. In re Paul, 94 N.Y. 496, 505 (1884).
51. Act of May 12, 1884, ch. 272, 1884 N.Y. Laws 335.
52. See In re Henneberger, 155 N.Y. 420, 50 N.E. 61 (1898), for a discussion of legisla-
tion that was general in form but local in fact. C. JACOBS, supra note 34, describes courts
engaging in "minute analyses of challenged statutes in order to discover their partial charac-
ter although the laws were, on their face, general. In such a way the judiciary acquired addi-
tional power as the supervisor of relations between the state and the private economy." Id. at
44.
53. The following table shows the proportion of statutes declared unconstitutional be-
cause they were not in proper form for special legislation on a topic that had to be treated
generally:
1870-1874 9 of 30
1875-1879 10 of 17
1880-1884 8 of 17
1885-1889 7 of 20
1890-1894 5 of 33
1895-1899 4 of 42
1900-1904 8 of 60
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content of general legislation--determining, for example, the appro-
priate limitations on occupations in dwellings. In so doing, they con-
tinued the already familiar pattern of legislative choice, judicial de-
cision and legislative response. The details of that interaction
follow.
C. Developing Categories
The constitutional guarantee that no person shall be deprived
of life, liberty or property without due process is said to have func-
tioned during this period as "the principal guarantee of corporate
capitalism and private economic power."5 4 It could serve the func-
tion of protecting against legislative interference because its open
texture left the judges free to transform its guarantee into a judicial
review of the substance of legislative choice. In their due process
opinions, the judges fed the notion that resort to this guarantee was
frequent: "This species of legislation has been so often condemned
by this and other courts as to render any further discussion of its
impropriety and invalidity wholly unnecessary." 55 These decisions
fueled debate at the time about the proper limits on judicial choice
in a democracy and serve as a backdrop as that debate continues.
In fact, this "principal guarantee" was not often invoked by the
judges. In the fifty years between 1870 and 1920 the New York
courts invalidated twenty-seven statutes on twenty-four subjects on
the basis of the due process clause.5 6 The first three decisions came
The derivation of the cases counted here is described infra note 56. The extent of change will
be obvious to anyone willing to compare a volume of state session laws from around 1870 with
another after 1900. While "the total of special laws was markedly less than in the mid-nine-
teenth century," W. Hurst, supra note 40, at 66, notes that special laws still constituted a
drain on legislative time and energy.
54. C. JAcOBS, supra note 34, at 24.
55. Colon v. Lisk, 153 N.Y. 188, 198, 47 N.E. 302, 305 (1897).
56. The cases counted were drawn from Corwin, supra note 35, and F. SMITH, JuDIcIAL
REVIEW OF LEGISLATION IN NEW YORK, 1906-1938 (1952). Each of these authors explains in
detail how he derived his lists, which totaled over 300 decisions. There were 31 decisions about
27 statutes on 24 subjects based at least in part on the due process clause. I will discuss 14 of
those subjects in detail. Five subjects that parallel subjects fully discussed are left to foot-
notes. I have concluded in the case of five statutes that no legislative response could have been
expected, for a variety of reasons: (1) The legislature had already repealed the statute declared
unconstitutional. Act of Mar. 19, 1901, ch. 128, 1901 N.Y. Laws 312, declared unconstitutional
in Fisher Co. v. Woods, 187 N.Y. 90, 79 N.E. 836 (1907). (2) A different and more stringent
statutory scheme was already in place when the forerunner was declared unconstitutional. Act of
May 27, 1896, ch. 931, 1896 N.Y. Laws 1005, declared unconstitutional in People v. Hawkins,
157 N.Y. 1, 11, 51 N.E. 257, 266 (1898) after it had been incorporated into Act of May 13,
1897, chs. 415 & 416, 1897 N.Y. Laws 461. (3) The federal commerce clause was also a basis for
decision and inhibited repassage. Act of Apr. 25, 1895, ch. 413, 1895 N.Y. Laws 263, substan-
tially reenacted in Act of May 13, 1897, ch. 415, 1897 N.Y. Laws 461, declared unconstitu-
Beyond Cases
in 1885, 1887 and 1888; the remainder came in the sixteen years be-
tween 1895 and 1912. The statutes invalidated ranged from an act
establishing a workers' compensation scheme57 to one lowering the
acetic acid requirement for cider vinegar made by a farmer in New
York from apples grown on his own land.58
When the courts did intervene with a decision that a statute
offended the requirements of due process, that decision became part
of a process of choice that had begun in the legislature and that con-
tinued past the judicial decision. The following accounts of that pro-
cess, of which the opinions are but a piece, confirm that the relation-
ship between court and legislature was one of continuing
interaction. These accounts both suggest the categories that help
explain that interaction and resist easy categorization. I use catego-
ries that help explain the nature of the interaction I have found
before suggesting themes that may cut across those categories.
Since the clear message from pursuing each of these stories was
that continued interaction between court and legislature was the
norm, I started there and began dividing by the form of interaction.
This involved asking what happened to the legislature's initial
choice after each statute had been declared unconstitutional. Was it
repeated by the legislature, accomplished by constitutional amend-
ment, approximated by competition or defeated by the courts?
Once the stories were thus divided, the task was to move beyond
description-to explain why disparate issues elicited similar forms
of interaction. Four different sorts of interaction required
explanation.
Statutes in the first group were proposed by established and
well-organized interest groups to protect property and propriety
from ongoing practices. Those who feared that these statutes-regu-
tional in People ex rel. Treat v. Coler, 166 N.Y. 144,59 N.E. 776(1901). Act of May 14, 1894,
ch. 698, 1894 N.Y. Laws 1744, declared unconstitutional in People v. Hawkins, 85 Hun. 43, 32
N.Y.S. 524 (1895). (4) The state constitution was being amended to eliminate the problems. Act of
Apr. 26, 1895, ch. 417, 1895 N.Y. Laws 266, declared unconstitutional in Wilson v. United
Traction Co., 72 A.D. 233, 76 N.Y.S. 203 (N.Y. App. Div. 1902).
Warren, supra note 21, does a similar counting for the United States Supreme Court
and concludes that, "[tihe National Supreme Court, so far from being reactionary, has been
steady and consistent in upholding all State legislation of a progressive type." Id. at 295. He
lists by subject the statutes that have been upheld. Brown, supra note 24, at 944, identifies 180
due process cases before the Supreme Court between 1868 and 1920. In only 13 were the stat-
utes at issue invalidated. However, from 1920-1927, 15 of 53 were invalidated.
57. Act of May 24, 1910, ch. 352, 1910 N.Y. Laws 625, declared unconstitutional in
Ives v. South Buffalo Ry., 201 N.Y. 271, 94 N.E. 431 (1911).
58. Act of Apr. 10, 1893, ch. 338, 1893 N.Y. Laws 655, as amended by Act of Apr. 10,
1901, ch. 308, 1901 N.Y. Laws 813, declared unconstitutional in People v. Windholz, 92 A.D.
569, 86 N.Y.S. 1015 (N.Y. App. Div. 1904).
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lating bulk sales, prohibiting liquor in dance academies and penaliz-
ing theft of cultivated oysters-would interfere with other property
interests argued in the abstract and without the force of organiza-
tion. Without effective opposition each of these statutes was
promptly passed again, and that was the end of the matter.
In passing statutes in the second group, the legislature deter-
mined highly disputed values involving the relation of labor and
capital. Both labor unions and businesses were organized and vocal.
In rejecting the resolution of serious dispute within the legislature,
the courts effectively required that the strength and representative-
ness of the legislature's initial choice be confirmed by constitutional
amendment. These disputes were far too public for proponents to
expect that the statute could simply be repassed. The initial resolu-
tion in the legislature, however, seems to have required sufficiently
strong proponents or enough compromise that the necessary amend-
ments-.on workers' compensation and the eight-hour day-were
readily accomplished.
In passing statutes in the third group, the legislature made
choices about market practices in a highly competitive milieu. The
initial legislative choice established or prohibited a competitive
practice that either held after the statute was found unconstitu-
tional or became a factor that influenced the choices of competitors.
The ultimate competitive arrangement - for railroad mileage
books, trading stamps and premiums - approximated the legisla-
ture's initial choice.
Statutes in the fourth group, regulating admission to certain
occupations, could be accepted uncritically by the legislature; the
statutes plausibly furthered the public welfare, and the regulatory
schemes they created could be financed and operated without fur-
ther legislative attention. The anticompetitive consequences of the
statutes became apparent when persons subsequently excluded from
the occupations challenged the statutes. The litigation effectively
destroyed the basis for the legislature's initial choice and the legisla-
ture left it at that.
These explanations are detailed in the discussion that follows.
Underlying the detail is continued, though varied, interaction be-
tween court and legislature. The legislature's initial choice, rather
than being negated by the courts, continued to play a significant role
in each of the first three groups. Only the final group might seem to
show the court prevailing in its opposition to legislative choice. Still,
if the initial legislative choices in that group were as casual and un-
critical as they seem to have been, it is hardly surprising that the
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legislature did nothing more once the courts provided reason to be
critical.
1. REPETITION OF LEGISLATIVE CHOICE
In the first group, the legislature protected values that were rel-
atively undisputed in public discourse from ongoing practices that
were fully detailed by respectable and organized proponents of the
statutes. The legislature was not thereafter swayed by a judge's
warnings, in declaring the statute unconstitutional, that other,
equally established, values might be jeopardized by the statute. 59
Both the judge and the opponents of the statute were forced to argue
hypothetical abuses because the statute had only just created the
purported danger. Under these circumstances, the "unconstitu-
tional statute" was simply passed again, and that was the end of the
matter. Either the opponents accepted their relative ineffectiveness
or time showed that the dangers attributed to the statute were illu-
sory. Thus, a Bulk Sales Act survived to prevent fraud; the prohibi-
tion on serving liquor in dance academies reappeared to help ensure
propriety; and statutes prohibiting theft maintained the right to
property in cultivated oysters.
The Bulk Sales Act is the most familiar of the three. It rested on
considerable evidence of fraudulent sales that was marshaled by the
men in the credit departments of corporations supplying small busi-
nesses:- "[W]hen a dealer has reached a point in his business career
where he cannot go on owing to the claims of creditors, the tempta-
tion is strong and the practice common of making a fraudulent sale.
Fraud works in secret, and the bargain is closed and the purchaser in
possession before the creditors know anything about it."6 0
59. See infra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
60. Wright v. Hart, 182 N.Y. 330, 346, 75 N.E. 404, 410 (1905) (Vann, J., dissenting).
A fraudulent bulk sale was alleged to have occurred in 1914, when the New York Bulk Sales
Act was in effect. Since the Act's procedures were not followed, the complaint provides a fair
picture of practice before the passage of the Act:
(David Klein] . . .was and still is a creditor of Sirrontis Maravelas and Nicholas
Varounes on account of goods and merchandise sold . . .for the sum of Two Hun-
dred Seventy-six 92/100 ($276.92) Dollars.
[P]rior to the 24th day of September . . .The said Sirrontis Maravelas and
Nicholas Varounes were conducting a lunch room and restaurant business at No. 95
Court Street, in the Borough of Brooklyn, City of New York.
[O]n or about the 24th day of September .... Sirrontis Maravelas and Nicholas
Varounes sold and transferred, and [Peter Maravelas] purchased said restaurant bus-
iness together with the goods, wares, merchandise and fixtures thereof in bulk, by a
bill of sale . . . filed . . .in the office of the Register of the County of Kings on the
28th day of September .... said bill of sale being numbered 40531.
Record on Appeal at 3-5, Klein v. Maravelas, 219 N.Y. 383, 114 N.E. 809 (1916).
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The National Association of Credit Men crusaded for the Bulk
Sales Act, which passed in New York in 1902.61 Justice Werner dis-
paragingly called this campaign one of those "organized crusades
upon legislatures by the advocates and supporters of special
classes."6 2 The statute required notice to each of the bulk seller's
creditors, at least five days before sale, of "the stated cost price of
merchandise to be sold and of the price proposed to be paid therefore
by the purchaser." 63 Notice was to dispel the secrecy and thus the
fraud.
In holding the Bulk Sales Act unconstitutional, the New York
Court of Appeals evidenced concern for the property rights of honest
merchants that equaled the legislature's concern for the property
The National Association of Credit Men and its local New York branches suspected
that fraud went beyond "previously honest debtors tempted into such acts of dishonesty by
their necessities and the hopelessness of their situation. . . ... Brief on Behalf of Intervenors,
N.Y. Credit Men's Association at 3, Klein v. Maravelas, 219 N.Y. 383, 114 N.E. 809 (1916).
Both creditors and neighborhood businesses were thought to suffer when schemers "set up a
business in a community, establish a line of credit, suddenly increase the stock by large
purchases, and then sell out to a confederate, who holds a sacrifice sale, the original debtor
meanwhile having absconded." Id.
61. Act of Apr. 11, 1902, ch. 528, 1902 N.Y. Laws 1294, amended by Act of May 3,
1904, ch. 569, 1904 N.Y. Laws 1385. New York's statute was one of 20 passed in the states
between 1900 and 1905-a piece of information supplied to Justice Werner by Justice Bart-
lett. Justice Werner was not persuaded by the argument of strength in numbers: "Statutes
that are passed pro bono publico rarely sweep the country with such irresistible momentum,
while much fantastic legislation has resulted from . . . the advocates and supporters of spe-
cial classes." Wright v. Hart, 182 N.Y. 330, 343, 75 N.E. 404, 409 (1905).
62. Wright v. Hart, 182 N.Y. 330, 343, 75 N.E. 404, 409 (1905). See also NATIONAL
CREDIT MEN'S Ass'N, LAWS REGULATING THE SALE OF STOCKS OF GOODS IN BULK 5 (1905).
There were parallel campaigns in this period of frequent business failure. The merchants of
New York City and of the state generally sought to make easier the prosecution of purchasers
who used false statements of business condition to obtain goods on credit. Letter from William
Travers Jerome, District Attorney of New York County to Cuthbert W. Pound, Counsel to
the Governor (May 9, 1905) accompanying T. Jerome, Brief on the Bill to Amend Section 544
of the Penal Code in Relation to Credit Statements, Act of May 18, 1905, ch. 556, 1905 N.Y.
Laws 1233 (bill jacket). Civil remedies were thought ineffective: "[T]he worst that can happen
[with a civil remedy] is that [the purchaser on credit] fails to get away with all his plunder. The
only effective remedy lies in provisions of the criminal law which make the risk of this sort of
crime too great, and thus prevent its commission." Id. at 3. The usual lack of evidence of
fraud, however, made criminal prosecution difficult. The bill provided that:
[WIhen property is purchased by aid of a written statement of the purchaser's means
or ability to pay, and the statements shall show that the purchaser conducts a speci-
fied kind of business and keeps books of account, if at the expiration of the term of
credit he fails to pay, he shall, during 90 days thereafter, submit his books to the
examination of the persons of whom the credit was obtained ...
Memorandum by Cuthbert W. Pound, Counsel to the Governor, Act of May 18, 1905, ch. 556,
1905 N.Y. Laws 1233 (bill jacket) (May 18, 1905). Bill jackets and veto jackets, which con-
tain an assortment of communications to the governor on bills that have passed the legisla-
ture, are available for 1905, and from 1926 to date.
63. Act of Apr. 11, 1902, ch. 528, § 1, 1902 N.Y. Laws 1249.
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rights of creditors. Honest merchants, who had every right to sell
their property in bulk, might be inhibited by the Act's procedural
requirements:64 "[T]he inventory may have to be duplicated by the
hundreds or thousands and sent to creditors scattered over all por-
tions of the globe;" 6 "[i]n case of creditors so far removed as to be
beyond the reach of the registered mail, personal service only would
answer the requirements of the statute."66 The remedy was thought
to be too drastic an imposition if the creditors' fears were no more
than "the fitful prejudices of the hour." 67
The proponents of the Bulk Sales Act responded with alacrity.
As one commentator observed, "[c]reditors are not only a very per-
sistent class of our population but one also very ingenious in their
methods of enforcing their rights."6 There was no coherent group
of regular or potential sellers or buyers of businesses in bulk to sup-
port the court's speculation about procedural horrors. The court's
hypotheticals about injury to the property rights of sellers remained
abstract, as opposed to the ongoing fraud documented by the
creditmen. Nor was there a way, within the framing values of hon-
esty and property, to give effect to the sympathy for the debtor that
sometimes surfaced. 69 A bulk sales act "similar in essentials to the
one condemned in 1905''7° was passed within a year. "In details it
may be distinguished from the earlier one, but the details are in real-
64. Wright v. Hart, 182 N.Y. 330, 75 N.E. 404 (1905). The close division of judges on
the New York Court of Appeals regarding the constitutionality of the Bulk Sales Act reflected
the division among courts across the country-"about an equal number of courts holding to
each side." Note, In How Far May Acts of the Legislature be Made Contingent Upon Being
Accepted by Popular Vote Without Violating the Principle That Legislative Power Cannot be
Delegated, 61 CENT. L.J. 3, 9 (1906).
65. Wright v. Hart, 182 N.Y. 330, 340, 75 N.E. 404, 408 (1905).
66. Id. at 345, 75 N.E. at 409.
67. Justice Cardozo writing for the majority in Klein v. Maravelas, 219 N.Y. 383,385,
114 N.E. 809, 810 (1916).
68. Note, Constitutionality of Legislation Prohibiting the Sale of Merchandise in Bulk, 59
CENT. L.J. 114 (1904). The Note examines the passage of the Bulk Sales Acts and includes an
excerpt from "the report of the legislative committee at the recent convention in New York
City of the National Association of Credit Men on July 15, 1905." Id. at 115.
69. "Whenever the poor debtor has discovered a byway by which to evade the pressing
exactions and hot pursuit of his creditor, the latter immediately proceeds to obstruct the new
byway by some statute contrived in some fertile legal brain and thus destroy its efficacy as a
means of escape to the beleaguered debtor." Id. at 114.
70. The description is from the case holding the statute constitutional, Klein v.
Maravelas, 219 N.Y. 383, 387, 114 N.E. 809,810 (1916). The record includes a chart detailing
the differences between the first statute and the second. The second statute can be found at
Act of Apr. 23, 1914, ch. 507, 1914 N.Y. Laws 2017.
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ity trifling."7 1 Governor Higgins agreed and vetoed the bill,72 but
Governor Hughes signed the same bill when it was passed yet again
in 1907. ' The court said no more until it decided in 1916 that this
virtually identical statute was constitutional.74
The pattern holds. Like the credit men, the proponents of the
regulation of dance academies gave substance to a threat to values
that were largely undisputed in public discourse. This time the val-
ues at stake were sobriety and propriety. These values were imposed
on the immigrants who used the dance academies as an entrance to
an American social life and as a major form of entertainment. " The
Women's City Club investigated the operation of these "unguarded
entrances to the pitfalls of city life." 76 The Juvenile Protection As-
sociation considered them "our most popular recreation controlled
by the liquor interests." 77 The legislature responded by requiring a
license and prohibiting the sale or service of liquor "in any public
dancing academy, or in any room connected therewith or on the
same floor of the building."78 Four months after the statute had
71. Klein v. Maravelas, 219 N.Y. at 385, 114 N.E. at 810.
72. PUBLIC PAPERS OF FRANK W. HIGGINS, GOVERNOR, 1906, at 99 (1907). "The
changes in phraseology do not meet the main objection of the court that such enactments
cannot be regarded as a valid exercise of the police power of the State." Id.
73. Act of July 24, 1907, ch. 722, 1907 N.Y. Laws 1683.
74. When challenged under the state constitution in 1916, the 1907 statute was upheld.
Klein v. Maravelas, 219 N.Y. 383, 114 N.E. 809 (1916). By that point, experience had ne-
gated the hypotheticals: "At the time of our decision in Wright v. Hart, such laws were new
and strange . .. the fact is that they have come to stay. . . . Back of this legisla-
tion ... there must have been a real need. We can see this now even though it may have
been obscure before." Id. at 385-86, 114 N.E. at 811. The United States Supreme Court had
already upheld the Bulk Sales Act against federal constitutional challenge. Kidd, Dater &
Price Co. v. Musselman Grocery Co., 217 U.S. 461 (1910); Lemieux v. Young, 211 U.S. 489
(1908).
75. Direct evidence about the movement for dance hall regulation in New York in 1909
is scant. A pamphlet distributed by the Juvenile Protection Association-L. BowDEN, OUR
MOST POPULAR RECREATION CONTROLLED BY THE LIQUOR INTERESTS: A STUDY OF PUBLIC
DANCE HALLS (1917)-describes Chicago 15 years later. However, Moskowitz, Forward to M.
LAMBEN, REPORT OF THE ADVISORY DANCE HALL COMMITTEE OF THE WOMEN'S CITY CLUB
AND THE CITY RECREATION COMMITTEE (1924) refers to a 1909 survey: "As a result of the
investigation in 1909, the first law licensing and regulating dance halls was passed." Id. at vii.
Turner, The Daughters of the Poor, 34 MCCLURE'S 45 (1909) describes the dancing academies
as the chief recruiting ground for procuring girls for the white slave trade.
76. Moskowitz, supra note 75, at vii.
77. L. BOWDEN, supra note 75, at 1.
78. Act of May 19, 1909, ch. 400, 1909 N.Y. Laws 862,864. The designation of "dance
academy" is not contrary to this working class, largely immigrant, sketch. As Justice Vann
observed in People ex rel. Duryea v. Wilber, 198 N.Y. 1, 11, 90 N.E. 1140, 1143 (1910) (Vann,
J., dissenting): "The word 'academy,' as used in the statute, has greater dignity than its defi-
nition, for it may be simply one room, but it must be a place, and it may be a large place, where
dancing is taught, after public advertisement, to all who are willing to pay for the privilege."
Concern about prostitution in this setting, though the statutes did not directly address it,
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been declared unconstitutional, 9 the legislature expanded it to in-
clude public dance halls as well as dance academies.80
The uneven match of legislative detail and judicial hypothetical
appears again in the controversy over cultivated oyster beds. The
property interests of oyster farmers were set against the property
interests of boat owners. The statute made boats subject to forfeit-
ure if used to interfere with oyster beds, even if they were used with-
out the owner's knowledge.8" The court's argument about property
interests was abstract because "the question [of constitutionality] is
to be determined not by what has been done under [the statute] in
any particular instance, but by what may be done under and by vir-
tue of its authority."82 The boat owner's argument about other pos-
sible legislative interferences with property was likewise
hypothetical:
The legislature might as well have declared that any horse and wagon or
other vessel used in carting or conveying oysters to market which have
been stolen shall be forfeited or go still further and direct that any oyster
or chop house selling oysters that may have been illegally removed from
an oyster bed shall be forfeited.
8 3
Concern about theft of cultivated oysters, detailed by the oyster
farmers who had supported the initial statute, prevailed over the
confirms the less than refined nature of some academies. Inspector No. I, in M. LAMBEN, supra
note 75, at 25, relayed the report of the boy in charge of the checkroom-"[t]hat there is a
small percentage of the girls, several of them hired instructors in the place, who are commer-
cial prostitutes." Id.
79. People ex rel. Duryea v. Wilber, 198 N.Y. 1, 11, 90 N.E. 1140, 1143 (1910).
80. Act of June 20, 1910, ch. 547, 1910 N.Y. Laws 1243. The opinion in People ex rel.
Duryea v. Wilber, 198 N.Y. 1, 90 N.E. 1140 (1910), is a thorough mix of due process and equal
protection arguments. First Justice Chase made clear that, "a license is not required for the
rooms or places in which dancing is taught in the City of New York to preserve public health
and safety." Id. at 9, 90 N.E. at 1142. Justice Chase evaluated the next argument-that a
license was needed because of the tendency to attract a crowd. He noted that the statute failed
to require the same of dance halls where instruction is not given. In concluding that the license
requirement was an unreasonable imposition, Justice Chase nonetheless suggested that the
proponents would be in a better position to defend the statute if they could expand the licens-
ing requirement. Because there is the possibility of correction by expansion, decisions that are
esentially based on the finding of a denial of equal protection have been described as less
destructive than those based on a denial of due process. See Railway Express Agency v. New
York, 336 U.S. 106, 111 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
81. Act of Apr. 23, 1896, ch. 383, 1896 N.Y. Laws 367 provided for the forfeiture of a
boat used to "interfere with, take, disturb or carry away the oysters of another lawfully
planted or cultivated in any of the waters of the state."
82. Colon v. Lisk, 153 N.Y. 188, 194,47 N.E. 302,303 (1897). There is no indication in
the summaries of argument by counsel or in the opinion that this was a boat owner who
claimed no knowledge of his boat's use.
83. Plaintiff's Brief in Support of Demurrer to Answer at 10, Record on Appeal, Colon
v. Lisk, 153 N.Y. 188, 47 N.E. 302 (1897). Kranz recounts protracted struggles involving the
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hypotheticals that the boat owners had offered. This statute also
soon reappeared among the session laws.84
The National Association of Credit Men, members of the
Women's City Club and oyster farmers gave substance to threats to
values of honesty, property and propriety that were not easily dis-
puted. Their organized voice, their appeal to established values and
their depiction of existing problems prevailed over the potential
dangers to property argued by one seller of a business in bulk, one
owner of a dance academy, one boat owner and several judges. The
initial statutes were repeated. 5
2. CONFIRMATION OF LEGISLATIVE CHOICE
When the legislature made a choice between highly disputed
values, with ardent and organized proponents on each side, the stat-
ute represented the resolution of sharp conflict, rather than a one-
sided imposition. Choices about the relation of labor and capital
produced these disputes, though the opposition was not always be-
tween employee and employer. In rejecting the results of pitched
legislative battle, the courts effectively required confirmation by
constitutional amendment of the strength and representativeness of
the legislature's initial choice. s6 That confirmation came quickly for
workers' compensation and for the eight-hour day on public works.
An understanding of the relation of labor unions and employers
during this period is important in evaluating the initial battles and
the rapid move to constitutional amendment. A shift in the fighting
issues between labor and employers reflected the fact that labor had
gained the power to dispute traditional employer assumptions. The
fighting issue shifted over the years from yellow dog contract to
open shop. Yellow dog or iron clad contracts between employer and
cultivated oyster in M. KRANZ, PIONEERING IN CONSERVATION: A HISTORY OF THE CONSER-
VATION MOVEMENT IN NEW YORK STATE 1865-1903 (1961).
84. Act of.Feb. 19, 1900, ch. 20, § 124, 1900 N.Y. Laws 22,45-47. In Colon v. Lisk, 153
N.Y. 188, 47 N.E. 302 (1897), Justice Martin, speaking for the court, held Act of Apr. 23,
1896, ch. 383, 1896 N.Y. Laws 367 unconstitutional both because there was no provision for a
jury in the forfeiture proceeding and because it constituted a denial of due process of law: "Its
sole purpose was to regulate private interests and enforce public rights." Id. at 198, 47 N.E. at
305. The 1900 statute did provide for jury trial, but the regulation remained basically the
same.
85. The treatment of women's night work followed this pattern once basic principles
about labor had been settled by constitutional amendment. See infra notes 131-35 and accom-
panying text.
86. The belief that you cannot just repass a statute already held unconstitutional may
have had enough currency with legislators that repassage only worked when no effective voice
reminded them that they were doing just that.
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employee forbid the employee to become a member of any labor or-
ganization. s7 An 1887 statute in New York forbade the yellow dog
contract as a condition of employment."s The power of the Knights
of Labor in that year may help explain the passage of the statute,
but the brief period of the Knights' strength only emphasized the
otherwise tenuous beginnings of the labor organization move-
ment.8 9 Twenty years later the statute was declared unconstitu-
tional, because it interfered with "[t]he free and untrammeled right
to contract ... ."90 That decision produced no immediate legisla-
tion reinstating the legislature's initial choice, for in the years be-
tween the passage of the statute and the decision about its constitu-
tionality the struggle between labor and employers had shifted away
from individual promises about union membership. 91
Unions had grown rapidly in New York since 1887, especially in
87. Variations in the content of such contracts are described by Witte, "Yellow Dog"
Contracts, 6 Wis. L. REv. 21 (1930) and H. MILLIs & R. MONTGOMERY, ORGANIZED LABOR
512-13 (1945). The 1904 contract between H. Marcus Skirt Co. and Hyman Scheinbaum, the
basis for the prosecution in People v. Marcus, 185 N.Y. 257, 260, 77 N.E. 1073, 1073 (1906),
illustrates the form and the sort of sanctions in yellow dog contracts:
"Party of the first part agrees to employ party of the second part as a piece
worker, and party of the first part agrees to pay for all finished work only on each and
every Tuesday. Party of the second part hereby agrees not to belong to any labor
union or to take part in any strike against party of the first part, and to work as an
individual in the open shop of party of the first part.
"Party of the second part further agrees that in the event of not complying
with all the articles herein mentioned to forfeit to the party of the first part his money
due for all work unpaid.
"Party of the second part also agrees to deposit $1.00 each week, which will be
deducted from his salary until the amount reaches ten dollars; same to be held as a
forfeit in the event of his not complying with all the above stipulations.
"H. Marcus Skirt Company agrees to keep party of the second part employed
so long as he proves satisfactory."
Id.
88. Act of June 24, 1887, ch. 688, 1887 N.Y. Laws 897.
89. See G. GROAT, TRADE UNIONS AND THE LAW IN NEW YORK, (Studies in History,
Economics and Public Law No. 3, 1905); N. WARE, THE LABOR MOVEMENT IN TIHE UNITED
STATES 1860-1895 (1919), especially as to the Knights of Labor.
90. People v. Marcus, 185 N.Y. 257, 259, 77 N.E. 1073, 1073 (1906).
91. Witte, supra note 87, at 28, describes labor's position:
A generation ago, labor interested itself in the enactment of laws prohibiting discrim-
ination against workmen for union membership, but it has long since become recon-
ciled to the decisions holding such laws to be unconstitutional. It concedes the em-
ployers' right to discriminate against union members, and even to exact promises
from their employes not to join a union. While it is free to counter such anti-union
policies by its own organizing campaigns, it does not complain, but it regards as
unfair a court order which forbids its fighting back.
Pressure for a legislative response would have confronted additional obstacles. In Adair
v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908), the Supreme Court held unconstitutional the Erdman
Act, which made it unlawful for an interstate carrier to discharge an employee because of
membership in a labor union. In Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915), the Court decided that
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
1899 through 1903.92 They were beginning to be incorporated into
the legal structure by statutes that authorized them to organize as
corporations, 93 that permitted them to acquire, construct and main-
tain buildings or halls for their use,94 and that protected labor meet-
ings from fraudulent representatives. 9' The existence of unions and
some of their methods had been recognized by the courts.96 The
strength of employers had likewise increased: "[T]he trend of indus-
trial development had increased the power of the employers to op-
pose the unions. In all industries business was conducted on a larger
scale than heretofore; in many, trusts had been formed. . . .Fur-
thermore, in many leading industries employers' associations had
been formed, whose members could be relied upon to stand together
in dealing with the labor problem." 97
Equivalent power of labor unions and employers is suggested
by paired statutes from 1904 and 1905. The first penalized "[a] per-
son who gives or offers to give any money or other things of value to
any duly appointed representative of a labor organization with in-
tent to influence him in respect to any of his acts, decisions, or other
duties as such representative, or to induce him to prevent or cause a
strike by the employees of any person or corporation. .... 9'g The
second penalized anyone who "gives, offers or promises to an agent,
employee or servant, any gift or gratuity whatever, without the
knowledge and consent of the principal, employer or master of such
an employer had a constitutional right to require that his employees sign an antiunion
contract.
92. G. GROAT, supra note 89. NEW YORK STATE LABOR DEP'T; Labor Organization in
1906, SixTH ANNUAL REPORT (1905-06), in BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, TWENTY FOURTH
ANNUAL REPORT 51 (1906).
93. Act of May 8, 1895, ch. 559, 1895 N.Y. Laws 329.
94. Act of May 23, 1895, ch. 713, 1895 N.Y. Laws 471.
95. Act of Apr. 30, 1898, ch. 671, 1898 N.Y. Laws 1547.
96. Jacobs v. Cohen, 183 N.Y. 207, 212, 76 N.E. 5, 7 (1905), within limits described in
Curran v. Galen, 152 N.Y. 33, 46 N.E. 297 (1897); National Protective Ass'n v. Cumming,
170 N.Y. 315, 321, 63 N.E. 369, 369 (1902). Accompanying recognition of union power was
some concern for the unions' irregular suspension of the rights of the individual members.
Corregan v. Hay, 94 A.D. 71, 87 N.Y.S. 956 (N.Y. App. Div. 1904); BUREAU OF LABOR STA-
TISTICS, 6 BULLETIN 292, 293 (1904); 1 NEW YORK STATE DEP'T OF LABOR, SECOND ANNUAL
REPORT 31-32 (1901-02),. That concern is also reflected in a law that sought to protect Na-
tional Guardsmen from being expelled from their unions, described in Note, The New York
Statute to Protect Militiamen From Discrimination by Labor Unions or Employers, 37 AM. L.
REv. 427 (1903).
97. F. STOCKTON, THE CLOSED SHOP IN AMERICAN TRADE UNIONS 44 (Johns Hopkins
University Studies in Historical and Political Science ser. 29, No. 3, 1911). The "Citizens'
Alliances" organized to promote the open shop: "By 1906 practically every city of importance
had its [Citizen's] Alliance. In many of the larger cities general employers' associations also
were formed. ... Id. at 46.
98. Act of May 9, 1904, ch. 659, 1904 N.Y. Laws 1655.
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agent, employee or servant, with intent to influence his action in
relation to his principal's, employer's or master's business .. ."'
Beneath the even-handed legislative treatment of employer and em-
ployee evidenced by these statutes, labor still struggled to gain the
strength that would make it fully equal in power.
By 1906, increased union strength meant that the employer's
struggle was more often with unions for control of the workplace and
less often with individual employees over their union connec-
tions.100 The Declaration of Labor Principles adopted in 1904 by
the National Association of Manufacturers assured that, "[t]he Na-
tional Association of Manufacturers is not opposed to organization
of labor as such. . ... 10 1 "[Tihe most ardent unionist will likewise
99. Act of Apr. 5, 1905, ch. 136, 1905 N.Y. Laws 225. The bill jacket contains a letter
from F.S. Allyn, a waiter in New York City, who had read that the bill would prohibit tipping.
He describes employment as a waiter and the importance of tips and concludes:
I do not ask you to take my word for the facts which I have mentioned, but I do ask
you to look them up for yourself, and I do ask that instead of making slaves of us, if
you can not better our position don't do any thing (sic] which will make it worse.
Above all be warned by one who is near the bottom of the stream, don't make to [sic]
many sociallists [sic]. Take my word for it the stream is strong and is steadily rising,
and it will require good judgement, Equality and justice to stem it.
Letter from F.S. Allyn (Mar. 23, 1905), 1905 N.Y. Laws 225 (bill jacket).
. 100. Yellow dog contracts would still sometimes be used. M. DUBOFSKY, WHEN WORK-
Ems ORGANizE 138 (1968) reports that in 1916 when Amalgamated was organizing New York
City subway workers, the IRT began circulating among its employees an individual labor
contract that forbade the signer to join any labor organization not recognized by the em-
ployer. All workers who signed were promised immediate wage increases. Yellow dog con-
tracts, however, were no longer a particularly useful tool. This was partly because they had
come to be largely ignored and partly because the fight had changed:
During the last decade of the 19th century and the opening years of the twentieth,
the individual, anti-union promise declined in importance as an instrument in labor
warfare. Its novelty had worn off, workmen no longer felt themselves morally bound
to live up to it, and union organizers, of course, wholly disregarded it.
J. SEIDMAN, THE YELLOW DOG CONTRACT 18 (Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical
and Political Science, ser. 50, No. 4, 1932). Yellow dog contracts did come to be widely used
"at the growing points of union organization and where attempts were made to initiate collec-
tive bargaining" after the United States Supreme Court decided in Hitchman Coal & Coke
Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229 (1917) that they were an adequate basis for an injunction
against union organizing. H. MILLIS & R. MONTGOMERY, supra note 87, at 512.
At that point, however, the New York courts completely destroyed the value of yellow
dog contracts to nonunion employers by holding that such contracts were "a mere under-
standing, lacking the essential elements of contracts, consideration." Witte, supra note 87, at
26, describes this in detail. This approach did not require repudiation of any of the cases
holding anti-yellow dog statutes to be unconstitutional. This approach also left undisturbed
the Supreme Court's conclusion in Hitchman Coal that an injunction was available against a
third party who induced the breach of a contract. Act of Jan. 25, 1935, ch. 11, 1935 N.Y. Laws
19, again declared yellow dog contracts void.
101. Declaration of Labor Principles, adopted at Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania (May 17,
1904), reprinted in National Ass'n of Manufacturers, Where do You Stand? (Nov. 1, 1907).
See also Note, Contracts of Labor Unions in New York, 5 COLUM. L. REv. 239 (1905).
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concede the right of the employer to engage non-union workmen if he
chooses .. ."102 The larger issue, control of the workplace,
eclipsed the included question of the individual's freedom to join a
union: "So far has the organization of the wage-workers proceeded,
and likewise the counter combination of the employers, that the
gravest of social problems has been narrowed down to . . . the
problem of the 'open' and 'closed' shop."' 3 Employers, who dis-
claimed any intention of fighting unions as such, met demands for
the closed shop with counterresistance: "Proprietors are organizing
unions to resist it, and non-union laborers are beginning to organize
such unions. . . . It is the case of strike meeting strike, lockout
against strike, boycott against boycott, fighting the devil with
fire."' °4 It was in this context, with effective organization on all
sides, that constitutional amendment served to resolve other issues
between labor and employers.
Limitation of hours of labor was one of these issues, between
forces that had come to take each other's power seriously. Labor
unions were agreed on the goal, if not always on how it should be
achieved.'0 5 "The eight-hour day is one of the most important arti-
cles in the creed of organized labor.. . . [T]he policy will be pushed
to the end, by trade agreements when possible, by legislation when
practicable and by strikes when necessary."' 0 6 Employers did not
respond to the eight-hour issue with the passion they had exhibited
for the open shop, but many did continue to insist that hours should
be determined by business convenience and by competition for the
102. White, The Issue of the Open and Closed Shop, 180 N. AM. REV. 28, 32 (1905)
(emphasis added).
103. Id. at 28. White attempts at length to resolve this problem, concluding that, "[t]he
task of each side is to prevent the other from making unfair use of its power, not to seek to
protect itself from oppression by curtailing the liberty of the other." Id. at 35.
104. Note, Points Relating to Union Labor, Strikes, Etc., 37 AM. L. REV. 422, 423-24
(1903).
105. Some of the businesses that voluntarily worked an eight-hour day also would have
favored legislation to force their competitors to follow the same practice.
106. Groat, The Eight Hour and Prevailing Rate Movement in New York, 21 POL. SCI. Q.
414, 428 (1906). The first legislative program of the Workingmen's Assembly in 1867 included
this demand, and, with the subsequently added demand for wages at the "prevailing rate," it
has "been repeated in every program since." Id. at 415. It was necessary that a prevailing rate
law be combined with the limitation to eight-hour workdays to maintain the daily wage "in
the face of attempts by contractors to cut it down one-fifth whenever forced to reduce the
hours of labor from ten to eight a day." BUnEAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, TWENTY THIRD AN-
NUAL REPORT FOR 1905, at xv, in NEW YORK STATE LABOR DEP'T, ANNUAL REPORT (1905-06)
I. YELLOWITZ, LABOR AND THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT IN NEW YORK STATE 1897-1916, at
22-39 (1965) describes labor's lobbying groups and their work for the eight-hour day.
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supply of labor."'
Some union members opposed governmental regulation of
working conditions through statute. They wanted labor to advance
its interests independently by organizing.10 8 Those within the un-
ions who were willing to resort to legislation prevailed,' 0 9 but rela-
tively little could be accomplished by legislation until the principle
was established that the hours of labor for a healthy, competent
male of age could be limited by law." 0 That principle had not yet
been established; statutory limitations on hours had only been
granted, grudgingly, on the basis of "disabilities," such as sex or
age."' Passage of a statute limiting employment on public works to
eight hours at prevailing rates was intended by labor to establish
that principle."I2 It was to provide a basis for "the movement for a
shorter work-day among workmen not employed on public
107. M. GREEN, THE NATIONAL CIVIC FEDERATION AND THE AMERICAN LABOR MOvE-
MENT 1900-1925, at 93 (1956); and A. STEIGERWALT, THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MANU-
FACTURERS: ORGANIZATION AND POLICIES, 1895-1914, at 207 (1952) report the opposition of
the National Association of Manufacturers. The National Civic Federation apparently did
not actively oppose the eight-hour day, but it was not an issue on which they were able to
obtain agreement from their labor and business members. See G. JENSEN, THE NATIONAL
CIVIC FEDERATION: AMERICAN BUSINESS IN AN AGE OF SOCIAL CHANGE AND SOCIAL REFORM,
1900-1910, at 130 (1956).
108. J. WEINSTEIN, THE CORPORATE IDEAL IN THE LIBERAL STATE 1900-1918, at 44
(1968). M. GREEN, supra note 107, at 192-94 describes this position and Gompers' move away
from it. Id. at 194. 2 Y. KAPP, ELEANOR MARx 390 (1976) describes the work in England of
The Legal Eight Hours and International Labor League and the opposition to them from the
antiparliamentarians who opposed resorting to legislation.
109. The primary alternative was to accomplish more limited hours by direct labor
pressure. That had proved successful for cigarmakers, carpenters, masons, and others, but
"the trades sufficiently skilled to build up strong organizations include only a minority of the
working people. In many cases, therefore, it will be necessary to invoke the power of the com-
munity, vested in the government, to complete the work of the labor organization." New
York State Bureau of Labor Statistics, Methods of Obtaining the Eight Hour Day, EIGHTEENTH
ANNUAL REPORT 83, 83 (1900).
110. The eight-hour day was first embodied in a statute in 1867 with the provision that,
"[ejight hours of labor, between the rising and setting of the sun, shall be deemed and held to
be a legal day's work, in all cases of labor and service by the day. ... Act of May 9, 1867,
ch. 856, 1867 N.Y. Laws 2138. The statute, however, allowed for "contract or agreement to
the contrary." Id. Thereafter labor sought to implement the eight-hour standard. Success
was limited: special statutes for well-organized trades were necessarily partial and efforts to
induce all laborers to refuse to work longer than eight hours would have required organization
beyond the capacity of the organized labor movement. Groat, upra note 106, at 427.
111. For a history of the regulation of hours generally, see Brandeis, Labor Legislation,
in 3 J. CoMMoNs, HISTORY OF LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES, 1896-1932 (1935).
112. Act of May 13, 1897, ch. 415, § 3, 1897 N.Y. Laws 461,462 (as amended by Act of
Apr. 1, 1899, ch. 192, 1899 N.Y. Laws 350 and Act of May 12, 1899, ch. 567, 1899 N.Y. Laws
1172).
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works,"' 13 at the same time that it protected public workers." 4
Contractors tended to ignore the statute,"' and, piecemeal, it
was declared unconstitutional."I 6 By 1904, it was a nullity." 7 The
principle, however, remained crucial to labor unions, and by the
time the statute had failed, they were in a position to press for a
constitutional amendment to confirm the legislature's initial choice
regarding hours on public works: "Other important measures were
for the time laid aside. All [labor] organizations were interested." 818
The necessary legislation for amendment was twice passed and rati-
fied. 911 A statute limiting hours on public works was again passed
113. 1 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, BULLETIN 83 (June 1899). It was for that very
reason that the National Association of Manufacturers so bitterly fought a similar federal bill,
NATIONAL AsS'N OF MFRS., EIGHT HOURS BY ACT OF CONGRESS: ARBITRARY, NEEDLESS, DF,-
gTucRTIVE, DANGEROUS (1904).
114. The number of laborers in the direct employ of the state was relatively small, so
the struggle for eight-hour workdays on public works centered largely on contract work. In
1900, the Attorney General held that the Albany Municipal Gas Company, which had the
contract for lighting the capitol, violated the statute by requiring its employees to work a
twelve-hour day. The courts disagreed: "The law, as interpreted by the courts, must therefore
be taken to apply not to the commodities supplied to the State but to work done for the State
by contract, and the definition of the term 'work' would seem to embrace little beyond con-
struction work." New York State Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 109, at 92 (emphasis
supplied).
115. Groat, supra note 106, at 419.
116. The prevailing rate provision was declared unconstitutional in People ex rel. Rod-
gers v. Coler, 166 N.Y. 1, 59 N.E. 716 (1901). This decision raised questions about the consti-
tutionality of the eight-hour clause:
The reason for failure in bringing many contractors to trial was the difficulty in se-
curing a true bill from a grand jury. The theory underlying the two clauses was the
same, they insisted, and if one clause was unconstitutional the other must be. Upon
request from the grand jury for instructions upon the point the court replied: 'That
law, I think, when the test comes, will be declared unconstitutional ...and if such
a case comes before you I would advise you to refuse to indict because any indict-
ment here brought would be set aside by this court.' Such was the feeling before the
matter was brought to final issue, and because of it several indictments were dis-
missed.
Groat, upra note 106, at 421.
117. People ez re/. Cossey v. Grout, 179 N.Y. 417,72 N.E. 464 (1904); People v. Orange
County Rd. Constr. Co., 175 N.Y. 84, 67 N.E. 129 (1903). The Labor Department pointed
out that "[olne of the grounds-perhaps the chief ultimate reason--on which the prevailing
rate of wages law is declared unconstitutional is that in prescribing a minimum compensation
for its employees the State may increase the cost of its work, and hence also the burdens of
taxation upon its citizens." 3 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, BULuTN 5 (Mar. 1901). It
provided the information to show that ultimately the measure did not cost the taxpayers. Id.
118. Groat, supra note 106, at 428. See also S. SEABURY, A REvIEw OF THE LABOR LAWS
RELATIVE TO THE RATE OF WAGES AND THE HOURS OF LABOR IN THE STATE OF NEw YORK
(1901).
119. N.Y. CoNS. art. XII, § 1 (current version at N.Y. CONST. art. XIII, § 14).
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and was promptly held constitutional.120
The principle involved in the fight for compulsory workers'
compensation 1 2 1 was likewise fundamental and highly disputed:
"The [workers' compensation] statute, judged by our common law
standards, is plainly revolutionary."' 122 The 1910 scheme was held
unconstitutional in 1911.123 In 1913, a constitutional amendment
was ratified, an extraordinary session of the legislature was called,
120. Act of May 19, 1906, ch. 506, 1906 N.Y. Laws 1394, limited labor on public works
to eight hours except in emergencies and was affirmed in People ex rel. Williams Eng'g &
Contracting Co. v. Metz, 193 N.Y. 148, 85 N.E. 1070 (1908).
121. Business members of the National Civic Federation, a tripartite organization of
business, labor and the public, were active in obtaining workers' compensation schemes in
New York and across the country-initially against labor opposition. Their reasoning was
that a compensation plan was efficient. It would "reduce the need for independent political
action by labor, as well as the appeal of unionism ... " J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 108, at 47.
P. Tecumseh Sherman, former Commissioner of Labor in New York State, made the efficiency
arguments in Sherman, The Efficient Enforcement of Labor Legislation, 2 PROCEEDINGS OF THE
AcADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE IN THE CITY OF NEw YORK 101, 104 (1911). Bauer, New
York Workmen's Compensation Act Unconstitutional, 1 AM. ECON. REV. 634, 635-36 (1911),
explained the ways in which the statute had been designed not to impose on businesses in
competition with businesses in other states that might not have workers' compensation and
how costs to employers could easily have been shifted to the public in general: "No hardships
were aimed at employers, and probably no serious ones would have been sustained." Id. at
636.
After thorough study in 1910, the National Association of Manufacturers supported
workers' compensation because "it would be useless 'to oppose it' and . . . it would not be
enough to be 'neutral."' J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 108, at 256. See also M. GREEN, supra note
107, at 248.
Employers thought that the statute avoided a particular inefficiency-the passage of
broader employer liability statutes. William J. Moran expressed the fear of "wide open" com-
mon law liability in Views of Legal Committee on Compensation for Industrial Accidents and
Their Prevention, of the National Civil Federation, Concerning Effect of Decision of the
Court of Appeals of the State of New York upon the Compulsory Compensation Principle in
its Relation to Uniform State Legislation, Executive Committee Meeting, in New York City
(Mar. 28, 1911) [hereinafter cited as Views of Legal Committee]: "Progressively burdensome
Employers' Liability laws are infinitely more unjust, alike to employe and employer, than a
reasonable compulsory compensation law." Id. at 8. Address by W. Emmet, The Workmen's
Compensation Situation in New York State, Meeting of the National Convention of Insur-
ance Commissioners, Burlington, Vt. 4 (Aug. 1, 1913), confirmed this fear: "Some of the advo-
cates of the Bayne-Sullivan bill stated very frankly that they were not so much interested in
establishing the principle of compensation in New York as in enlarging the common law liabil-
ity of non-assenting employers." See also A. STEIGERWALT, supra note 107, at 257.
Labor's early opposition to compensation legislation was based on the realization that
compensation laws "would pension off the worker during his period of disability at something
less than his regular wages," while eliminating the increasingly available possibility of high
awards from sympathetic jurors. J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 108, at 43. Moreover, "state pro-
vision of guildlike pensions and other welfare benefits would reduce the craftsman's loyalty to
the union." Id. at 44. Nonetheless, labor eventually joined in the debate about the proper
form and financing of workmen's compensation.
122. Justice Werner in Ives v. South Buffalo Ry., 201 N.Y. 271,285, 94 N.E. 431,436
(1911), regarding Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 674, 1910 N.Y. Laws 1945.
123. Ives v. South Buffalo Ry., 201 N.Y. 271, 94 N.E. 431 (1911).
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and a compulsory compensation plan was in place in six days. 124
The story is fully told elsewhere. 125
Constitutional amendment helped settle more than the specific
choice involved and thereby provided a basis for resolving other la-
bor issues without resort to amendment. In 1895, a statute that lim-
ited employment on public works to United States citizens and gave
a preference to citizens of New York was held unconstitutional. 126
The limitation reappeared in 1902.127 Its constitutionality was af-
firmed in 1915 on the basis, among others, of the constitutional pro-
vision that supported the limitation to eight hours on public
works. 128
As some principles of the relationship between capital and labor
began to be settled by constitutional amendment, arguments for
and against labor legislation increasingly could be factual. Due pro-
cess doctrine began to shift toward judicial evaluation of the factual
basis for legislative choice. 1 29 Labor legislation that had been de-
clared unconstitutional could be reinforced and repassed after addi-
tional factual inquiry. 3 o This shift from extensive argument about
124. Acts of Dec. 16, 1913 and Jan. 8, 1914, ch. 816, 1913 N.Y. Laws 2977, repassed as
Act of Mar. 16, 1914, ch. 41, 1914 N.Y. Laws 216, and held constitutional in Jensen v. South-
ern Pac. Co., 215 N.Y. 514, 109 N.E. 600 (1915). Speech by Frank Hasbrouck, Superintend-
ent of Insurance of New York State, The Workman's Compensation Situation in New York
State, National Convention of Insurance Commissioners, Asheville, N.C. (Sept. 17, 1914)
describes the process in detail.
125. J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 108; Devine, Compensation Bills at Albany, 29 SuRv.
722, 722-24 (1913); Seager, The Compensation Amendment to the New York Constitution, 2 PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK 75-79 (1911);
Views of Legal Committee, supra note 121; Wesser, Conflict and Compromise: the Workmen's
Compensation Movement in New York 1890's-1 918, 12 LAB. HIsT. 345 (1971).
126. Act of May 10, 1894, ch. 622, 1894 N.Y. Laws 1569 (amending ch. 385, 1870 N.Y.
Laws 919). People v. Warren, 13 Misc. 615, 34 N.Y.S. 942 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1895).
127. Act of Apr. 10, 1902, ch. 454, 1902 N.Y. Laws 1098.
128. People v. Crane, 214 N.Y. 154, 171,108 N.E. 427, 433 (1915).
The legislature is now empowered by the constitution to fix the wages and salaries of
all employees upon the public works. This authority embraces the direct increase of
expense by increasing salaries beyond the minimum fixed by competition. It must
also embrace the indirect increase of expense by regulations of employment tending
to diminish competition.
The constitutionality of this statute was likewise affirmed in Heim v. McCall, 214 N.Y. 629,
108 N.E. 1095 (1915) (mem. op.), aff'd, 239 U.S. 175 (1915).
129. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
130. In New York, such factual arguments on labor questions would have been facili-
tated by the abundant supply of readily accessible data. The Factory Investigating Commis-
sion was created by the legislature in Act of June 30, 1911, ch. 561, 1911 N.Y. Laws 1269 after
the Triangle Waist Company fire. It was assigned to investigate "the existing conditions
under which manufacture is carried on. ... Id. § 1. "In the first two years alone the com-
mission held more than 50 public hearings, examined approximately 500 witnesses, and took
over 7,000 pages of testimony." C. BEYER, HISTORY OF LABOR LEGISLATION FOR WOMEN IN
THREE STATES 79 (U.S. Dep't of Labor Women's Bureau Bulletin No. 66, 1929). The commis-
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principles to extensive argument about facts was apparent in the
treatment of the two New York statutes prohibiting women's night
work.131 The first was declared unconstitutional in 1907132 on the
basis of largely abstract arguments about denials of privileges and
freedom of contract. 133 The second was passed in 1913 at the behest
sion continued its work for four years and produced a final report to the legislature in 11
volumes. The report of the commission supported 36 new labor statutes in three years. The
legislation passed is partly described in Brandeis, supra note 111, at 478. Beyer characterized
this as "'the golden era in remedial factory legislation' in the State of New York." C. BEYER,
supra this note, at 79.
131. The first provision regarding night work was in 1889 and applied to men under 18
and women under 21 who worked in factories. Act of June 15, 1889, ch. 560, 1889 N.Y. Laws
752. Women under 21 constituted 70% of that work force. Brandeis, supra note 111, at 469.
Act of Apr. 1, 1899, ch. 192, 1899 N.Y. Laws 350, 352-53, extended the limitation on night
work in factories to all women, irrespective of age. C. BEYER, supra note 130, at 104, states
that:
At the time there was little discussion of the merits or demerits of the prohibition of
night work as such for adult women. This prohibition was part and parcel of the
hours legislation for younger women and minors and was applied to adult women,
first, to aid enforcement and, second, to give these women the same legal protection
afforded to women under 21.
It appears that the statute was largely ignored and not enforced because of a fear that it
might be tested and found unconstitutional. 1 NEw YORK STATE FACTORY INVESTIGATING
COMM'N, SECOND REPORT 211 (1913) [hereinafter cited as FACTORY INVESTIGATING COMM'N].
"The enforcement of the night work law remained more or less of a dead-letter for the follow-
ing seven years." C. BEYER, supra note 130, at 104. "The constitutionality of the factory
night-work law was always a question in the minds of the enforcing officials. They allowed
violations to go unnoticed rather than run the risk of having a test case." Id. When a test case
seemed inevitable, it was suggested the statute be revised so that the protection of younger
women could be preserved. This was done in 1907 when the Court of Special Sessions declared
the statute unconstitutional. The bill passed before the Court of Appeals declared the original
law limiting night work to all women unconstitutional in People v. Williams, 189 N.Y. 131, 81
N.E. 778 (1907). The governor signed the bill after that decision.
132. People v. Williams, 189 N.Y. 131, 81 N.E. 778 (1907) (Act of Apr. 15, 1903, ch.
184, § 2, 1903 N.Y. Laws 437, 439 was declared unconstitutional. This statute was virtually
identical to Act of Apr. 1, 1899, ch. 192, 1899 N.Y. Laws 350, 352-53, regarding night work by
women. Both statutes amended the New York labor law, Act of May 13, 1897, ch. 415, § 77,
1897 N.Y. Laws 461,478-79.). The judge found "nothing in the language of that section which
suggests the purpose of promoting health except as it might be inferred that for a woman to
work during the forbidden hours of night would be unhealthful." Id. at 134, 81 N.E. at 779.
The consequences of the decision were apparently great, though short lived:
The public press misconstrued [the] decision and announced that the short hours law
for women was wiped out by the courts. The Department of Labor tried to make it
clear that this was not the case, but in spite of all its efforts the law limiting daily and
weekly hours was utterly disregarded. There was no use in taking violations to the
Courts, for the decision in the Williams case made the constitutionality of all labor
legislation for women doubtful-judges were loathe to convict even in clear cases.
Demoralization of the laws continued until 1908.
C. BEYER, supra note 130, at 76.
133. The attorney general, defending the statute, did claim that, "[t]he universal expe-
rience of laborers is that night labor is detrimental to health. Night is the natural time for rest
and rest procured during the day is usually broken and unsatisfactory in its character." How-
ever, he offered no support for that assertion. Appellant's Brief at 4, Record on Appeal, People
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of the Factory Investigating Commission, following its study of
women working the night shift in a cordage factory. 134 Subsequent
arguments about the statute were intensely factual and the court
explicitly relied on the second statute's factual basis in declaring it
constitutional.1 35 As factual basis became more central to judicial
evaluation, interaction between court and legislature became sim-
pler and more like the routine of invalidation and repassage that
characterized the first group.
Pitched battles in the legislature regarding the relation of labor
and capital were replayed as issues of constitutional amendment.
Because the initial battles over workers' compensation and the
eight-hour day were fought with powerful and organized proponents
on each side, the campaign for the passage of legislation was much
like the campaign for a constitutional amendment. The amendment
v. Williams, 189 N.Y. 131, 81 N.E. 778 (1907). The defendant's attorney assumed the facts he
needed for his argument: "Would not ten hours of labor by women during the day, standing
for long periods on their feet, have the same general result as the same conditions at
night? . . . The Attorney-General's argument, if logically pursued, would justify a statute
forbidding all female labor in factories day or night." Respondent's Brief at 9, Record on
Appeal, People v. Williams, 189 N.Y. 131, 81 N.E. 778 (1907).
134. Act of Mar. 15, 1913, ch. 83, 1913 N.Y. Laws 150. The commission thought the
new statute could be constitutional given "the existence of many facts of common knowledge
regarding the necessity for the prohibition of night work on physical, moral and administra-
tive grounds. . ." 1 FACTORY INVESTIGATING COMM'N, supra note 131, at 204. The "facts of
common knowledge" included the commission's own cordage factory study, which established
that of 100 women working the night shift, 75 were mothers whose chief reason for working
from 7:00 p.m. to 5:30 a.m. was to be able to care for their children during the day. 2 FACTORY
INVESTIGATION COMM'N, supra note 131, at 439-58. "The women with families averaged about
4 1/2 hours sleep a day." Id. at 453. In addition to the danger to these particular women, the
commission found that, "the provision of legal closing and opening hours is the only effective
method of enforcing the [more general] limitation of hours [for women]." 1 FACTORY INVESTI-
GATING COMM'N, supra note 131, at 212.
135. When the second night-work statute was challenged, Goldmark and Brandeis sub-
mitted a 529 page "Summary of Facts of Knowledge." Record on Appeal, People v. Charles
Schweinler Press, 214 N.Y. 395, 108 N.E. 639 (1915). Abram Elkus, Robert Wagner and Ber-
nard Shientag, in the Brief Submitted on Behalf of the New York State Factory Investigating
Commission as Amicus Curiae, summarized the findings of the New York State Factory In-
vestigating Commission, which had proposed the statute. Id. The district attorney joined by
summarizing the facts from the Factory Investigating Commission's Report and the "Sum-
mary of Facts of Knowledge" and by using these facts in his argument. Id. So did the oppo-
nents of the statute who pointed out factual weaknesses in the labor argument. J. BAER, THE
CHAINS OF PROTECTION: THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO WOMEN'S LABOR LEGISLATION 80-81
(1978). In deciding that the statute was now acceptable, the court gave "serious consideration
and great weight to the fact that the present legislation is based upon and sustained by an
investigation by the legislature deliberately and carefully made through an agency of its own
creation." People v. Charles Schweinler Press, 214 N.Y. 395, 412, 108 N.E. 639, 644 (1915).
The court also suggested that the lawyers who defended the first statute had failed "ade-
quately to fortify and press upon our attention the constitutionality of the former law as a
health and police measure and to sustain its constitutionality by reference to proper facts and
circumstances." Id. at 411, 108 N.E. at 644.
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fight may even have been easier for, though the requirements for
amendment were more demanding, the compromises that had pro-
duced the initial legislation had already diminished opposition.
Once the courts rejected the legislature's result, proponents did not
seem to have difficulty getting the legislature's initial choice con-
firmed by constitutional amendment. The understandings thereby
built into the constitution made it easier for the legislature to rein-
force and repeat other labor legislation.
3. APPROXIMATION OF LEGISLATIVE CHOICE
New York's legislature attempted to structure the market to
preserve effective competition. Certain market practices were re-
quired; others were prohibited. Competitors were remarkably
adaptable;' 36 in the time between passage and invalidation, legisla-
tive solutions became real factors in their calculations. Required
marketing techniques, like railroad mileage books, came to be ex-
pected by the public. Prohibitions, like those on trading stamps and
premiums, warned that there were costs to the trade as practiced
that could not be counted on to disappear with the statute. After
each statute was held unconstitutional, competitors approximated
the legislature's initial choice.
Approximation of the legislature's choice was easiest and quick-
est when legislation imposed a market practice-that practice
promptly became part of the structure of competition. Once imple-
mented, a legislatively mandated practice would survive judicial in-
validation if no competitor was prepared to take the risk of being the
first to move back to business as it had been conducted before the
statute. The New York requirement that railroads issue twenty-dol-
lar mileage books for one thousand miles of travel 3 ' was declared
136. Business methods, especially in the retail trade, were markedly in flux at the turn
of the century. A. CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERI-
cAN BUSINESS (1977); S. HABER, EIICIENCY AND UPLIFT: SCIENTIFIC MANAGEmENT IN THE
PROGRESSIVE ERA 1890-1920 (1964); Rubinow, Premiums in Retail Trade, 13 J. POL. ECON.
574 (1905). Studies of retailing and "how to do it" books on retailing were plentiful around
1900. E. CAKINS & R. HOLDEN, MODERN ADVERTISING (1905); G. MCLEAN, How To Do
BuSINESs (1890).
137. Act of June 15, 1895, ch. 1027, 1895 N.Y. Laws 961. The legislative history was
stipulated in Return on Appeal From Judgment and Order of Afrmance at 22, Beardsley v.
New York, L. E. & W. R.R., 162 N.Y. 230, 56 N.E. 488 (1900):
It is further stipulated to be a fact that the Commercial Travelers' Associa-
tion, the members of which had been, prior to March 15th, 1895, in the habit of using
one thousand mile mileage books for transportation over all the lines of railroad of
the defendant from New York to Chicago, caused to be introduced in the Legislature
of the State of New York the act now known as Chapter 1027 of the Laws of 1895,
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unconstitutional in 1900. The court saw the statute as "an arbitrary
enactment in favor of the persons . .. [who were able or willing to
purchase one-thousand-mile tickets] who, in the legislative judg-
ment, should be carried at less expense than the other members of
the community." I38 The New York requirement, however, lived on,
given life after unconstitutionality by railroad competition. So the
Public Services Commission concluded from its hearings on passen-
ger rates in 1907: "First, the representatives of the railroads were
unanimous that the mileage book was to them a very unsatisfactory
form in which to sell transportation; second, no railroad was willing
to abandon it or had under consideration the subject of abandoning
it." 139 The use of mileage books was "practically universal." 40 The
and declared upon the hearing before the committees of the legislature, through their
representative, Mr. H.M. Glenn, who was a member of the said Commercial Trav-
elers' Association and also a member of the Assembly, that said act was suggested
and asked to be passed for the purpose of restoring the practice which the defendants
and other similar corporations had voluntarily instituted and subsequently termi-
nated, of using thousand-mile books, good over their entire lines, and that their pur-
pose was to compel the defendant, and also similar companies, to issue such mileage
books, entitling the holders thereof to travel one thousand miles over such lines of
railroad, whether in the State of New York or elsewhere.
138. Beardsley v. New York, L. E. & W. R.R., 162 N.Y. 230, 233, 56 N.E. 488, 489
(1900) (quoting Justice Peckham in Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. v. Smith, 173 U.S. 684 (1899)).
The New York court felt that a recent decision of the United States Supreme Court on a
similar Michigan statute controlled: "It is not necessary nor would it be profitable for us to
review the discussion or argument by which the result was reached." Id. Among the lower
courts, the statute had been found unconstitutional in Watson v. Delaware, L. & W. R.R., 32
Misc. 311, 66 N.Y.S. 798 (1900) and constitutional in Dillon v. Erie R.R., 19 Misc. 116, 43
N.Y.S. 320 (1897).
139. 1 NEW YORK PUBLIC SERVICES COMM'N, SECOND DISTRICT, FIRST ANNUAL RE-
PORT FOR THE SIX MONTHS ENDING DEC. 31, 1907, N.Y. SEN. Doc. No. 585, at 40 (1908)
[hereinafter cited as FIRST ANNUAL REPORT]. See generally id. at 36-50. The proposal to re-
quire mileage books was part of a public demand, or at least an expectation, of a fare of two
cents a mile. The legislature passed such an act, A. B. No. 2269, in 1907 but Governor Hughes
returned it without approval because "[t]he passage of the bill was not preceded by legislative
investigation or suitable inquiry under the authority of the State [and] [sluch a body [which
can investigate and make appropriate orders] has been created in this State through the Pub-
lic Service Commissions Law recently enacted." PUBLIC PAPERS OF CHARLES E. HUGHES,
GOVERNOR, 1907, at 88 (1908).
The Public Services Commission, in its subsequent investigation, found the extensive
use of mileage books at two cents a mile relevant to what the railroads could afford generally:
"[T]here is no such distinction between transportation by means of a mileage book and that by
means of an ordinary ticket as to justify the conclusion that transportation by ticket cannot
be afforded at the same price as by mileage book." 1 FIRST ANNUAL REPORT, supra this note,
at 50. The two cent fare had occasionally been imposed on a particular road or portion of a
road. See H. APTHORP, THE Two CENT RAILROAD FARE (1892-97).
The commission's report implies that the books had been in use continually since the
time they were unwillingly introduced by the railroad. Obtaining real compliance from the
railroads in the first few years was difficult, and the Board of Railroad Commissioners received
numerous complaints. See 1 NEw YORK PUBLIC SERVICES COMM'N, THIRTEENTH ANNUAL
REPORT FOR 1895, 2 N.Y. SEN. Doc. No. 10, FT. 1, at xxxi (1896); 1 NEW YORK PUBLIC
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railroads "encouraged and propose[d] to perpetuate it."141 Compe-
tition maintained the legislature's choice of market structure.
When the legislature initially prohibited marketing practices,
the statute carried the worrisome message that these practices were
bad for competition. Judicial invalidation of these prohibitions
stayed the urgency of the message but not its import. The message
from the statutes contributed to the subsequent choices of partici-
pants to restructure these practices. Restructuring helped produce
the competition the legislature wanted. When the legislature acted
again, it was to reinforce these changes or to regulate portions of the
problem that competitors could not reach. This was a more compli-
cated process than when competition maintained the legislatively
required practice of issuing mileage books. Approximations of the
legislature's prohibitions took some time.
New York's legislature persistently sent the message that the
trade in trading stamps hindered competition. 14 2 Sperry and
Hutchinson (S & H) led in responding to that message. It was
Sperry and Hutchinson who, in 1896, had first made a business of
trading stamps, separating the production and redemption of trad-
ing stamps from the manufacture and selling of goods.' 43 From the
first, S & H billed its product, "the little green stamp," as a means of
competition. The chicanery of the numerous imitators who quickly
materialized endangered the claim that trading stamps furthered
competition. Stamp companies would sell supplies of stamps in an
area until the books began to come in, and then they would move to
new territory; 144 independent stamp salesmen would promise a mer-
chant exclusive rights in his neighborhood without having the ca-
pacity to bind the stamp company. 145 These would later be de-
scribed as the "wildcat days."'146 In addition, the newness and
complexity of the scheme made it hard for merchants and customers
SERVICES COMM'N, FOURTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1896,2 N.Y. SEN. Doc. No. 10, PT. 1,
at xvii (1897); and 1 NEw YORK PUBLIC SERVICES COMM'N, SIXTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT FOR
1898, 2 N.Y. SEN. Doc. No. 1, at 227 (1898).
140. 1 FIRST ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 139, at 39.
141. Id. at 41.
142. Act of May 5, 1900, ch. 768, 1900 N.Y. Laws 1633; Act of May 9, 1904, ch. 657,
1904 N.Y. Laws 1651.
143. Vrendenburg, From Stamp to Major Industry, in TRADING STAMP PRACTICE AND
POLICY 4 (A. Haring & W. Yoder eds. 1958). The editors obtained their information from
interviews with various executives associated with the trading stamp industry. See also Clapp,
Trading Stamps, 23 OHIO ST. L.J. 35 (1962).
144. Vrendenburg, supra note 143, at 4.
145. ANTI-STAMPER ASS'N OF N.Y., ANTI-STAMPER 6-7 (1904).
146. F. WAGGONER, PREMIUM ADVERTISING AS A SELLING FORCE 96 (1939). Waggoner
summarizes: "[B]ecause they [the stamps] were a new salesbuilding force, and marvelously
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to evaluate the sales pitch. Customers were vulnerable to that
"common weakness of human nature, the eager desire to get some-
thing for nothing." 4" The New York legislature attempted to solve
these problems in 1900 by outlawing trading stamps.' 4"
Dissatisfaction with the trade in trading stamps did not end
with the court of appeals decision that the 1900 statute was "not a
lawful exercise of the police power of the Legislature. ... , 149 A
formal resolution in 1904 by the Niagara Falls Central Labor Coun-
cil, the Building Trades Council and the Retail Clerk's Protective
Union, reflects this continuing discontent:
WHEREAS, The Trading Stamp system has been introduced in this
city to the detriment of the merchants and to the wage earners espe-
cially, and
WHEREAS, The said Trading Stamp companies are a lot of outside
monopolies who came here at the solicitation of a few to extract money
from the merchant at the expense of the consumers with the pretense of
giving them something for nothing, and
WHEREAS, The public and wage earners especially of this city are
tired of being the tools of a lot of grafters; now therefore, be it
RESOLVED, That this Central Labor Council in regular session assem-
bled on this 21st day of January, 1904, stamp its disapproval at this
mode of fleecing the public under the guise of charity.
RESOLVED, That this council send a copy of this resolution to Hon.
John H. Leggett and ask him to use his best influence to have laws
passed at Albany to abolish this evil.' 50
"[Prohibitory legislation has run its course ... ," warned Sperry
and Hutchinson, "[but a] new phase of the situation is now claiming
our attention, to-wit, regulation of business by laws which are an
successful, there was too great a temptation to use them with almost reckless abandon." Id. at
95.
147. ANTI-STAMPER Ass'N OF N.Y., supra note 145, at 3.
148. Act of May 5, 1900, ch. 768, 1900 N.Y. Laws 1633. It became a misdemeanor to
issue trading stamps or to present them to customers. There was an exception for tickets,
coupons or other vouchers issued with goods by the manufacturer of goods and redeemable by
him.
149. People ex rel. Madden v. Dycker, 72 A.D. 308, 317 (N.Y. App. Div. 1902).
150. ANTI-STAMPER Ass'N OF N.Y., supra note 145, at 9. The alternative to legislation
was self-help, which the Niagara Falls merchants are reported to have used: "[Elarly in Febru-
ary the Niagara Falls Merchants' Exchange voted to throw out the stamps on March? 'in the
interest of the people at large."' Id.
The New York City Federation of Women's Clubs, meeting at the Hotel Astor on Octo-
ber 29, 1915, adopted a contrary resolution:
WHEREAS: A very large number of women procure comforts and furnishings for
their homes through the use of trading stamps and coupons, which are given with
purchases of standard articles by manufacturers, and on purchases in their stores by
retailers, and it has been shown that these tokens aid the women in the home, by
offering a definite profit-sharing plan; that these tokens are given without raising the
cost or lowering the quality of the goods sold, and
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indirect prohibition. . . . [W]e venture to suggest that . . . this
power of regulation, like charity, is often used as a cloak for a com-
mission of a multitude of sins." 15 1 Sperry and Hutchinson was right
about the imminence of indirect prohibition. A statute passed in
New York in 1904 required the stamp companies to print the re-
deemable value on the face of the stamp and to redeem the stamps in
money "at the option of the holder . . . [when stamps are]
presented for redemption in number or quantity aggregating in
money value not less than five cents in each lot." 5 2 If the company
failed to redeem in money, the merchant was required to do so.'"3
The statute effectively eliminated the certainty of profit from premi-
ums purchased in bulk and gave value to less than completed books
of stamps. New York's courts and legislature may well have agreed
that the purpose of the statute was to eliminate the stamp compa-
nies, for redemption in merchandise is "[t]he rock on which the sys-
tem is built,"' 5 4 and unredeemed stamps provided an economic
WHEREAS: An effort is being made by some to influence retailers and manufactur-
ers to abandon the giving of these trading stamps and coupons,
THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED: That we urge all club members and other
women to take definite and immediate action to prevent the discontinuance of the
giving of such trading stamps and coupons, because of the hardship it would entail on
those families least able to be deprived of such comforts and furnishings.
Reported in 1 THE SPERRY MAG. 20 (No. 6,1915). The state of trading stamps was different by
1915, but so were the classes from which these two groups drew their members.
151. Correspondence, 58 CENT. L.J. 355 (1904).
152. Act of May 9, 1904, ch. 657, 1904 N.Y. Laws 1651.
153. Id.
154. People ex rel. Appel v. Zimmerman, 102 A.D. 103, 109 (N.Y. App. Div. 1905). In
theory the trading stamp scheme, and thus the legislature's restriction, worked as follows.
The merchants were to get more business. As Sperry and Hutchinson explained in their stamp
books, "the merchants make no advance in the price of their goods, and have so contracted
with this company, but, on the contrary, the increase of trade secured by them by this plan
will enable them to sell closer than ever before." People ex rel. Madden v. Dycker, 72 A.D.
308, 311 (N.Y. App. Div. 1902). For the same price, the customer was to get a valuable pre-
mium-a discount for paying cash. See F. WAGGONER, supra note 146, at 96. The stamp com-
pany was to make money because it was able to buy the premiums in bulk and therefore at a
reduced rate. People ex rel. Appel v. Zimmerman, 102 A.D. at 109 (N.Y. App. Div. 1905).
In practice, the merchant lost any competitive advantage as soon as stamps were
widely given. ANTI-STAMPER ASS'N OF N.Y., supra note 145, at 5. It is likely that the customer
paid a higher price. As the Anti-Stamper Association put it: "The Trading Stamp Company
plucks one of two geese-the dealer or the public, and the dealer is not goose enough to stand
plucking very long." Id. The Anti-Stamper Association worked to educate about the fraud of
trading stamps, and by 1904 antistamp organizations had been formed in 28 New York cities
and towns. As to the value of premiums purchased in bulk, the Merchant's Association of New
York investigated and found more than economies of scale: "[Vialues placed upon the mer-
chandise for which the stamps may be exchanged is so enormously inflated that in many cases
it runs from 500 to 1,000 per cent above the actual market prices of the articles given." Quoted
in ANTI-STAMPER Ass'N OF N.Y., supra note 145, at 9.
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cushion for the companies. 155 The statute, effectively another prohi-
bition, was also held unconstitutional.156
Under judicial reprieve, the major stamp companies helped re-
claim the trading stamp as a competitive device. Ironically, this was
accomplished with the elimination of most of the competing stamp
companies. Reduction ensured that not every retailer had access to
stamps, for with uniform use among retailers competitive advantage
was largely lost.1 57 "Those [stamp companies] that remained were
the far-seeing and conservative ones who were responsible for hav-
ing safely steered the business on its legitimate course. ... 158
Sperry and Hutchinson began to dominate the field and tried to
identify the virtue of fair and even-handed competition with the vir-
tues of the home: "Frankly we are trying to lift the organization to
higher and better things, to make it more useful, more effectual as a
trade medium which ties up business and the home as no other
agency has done, or can do." 5 9 The New York legislature's reaction
by 1908 was to rely on the stability of the once-outlawed stamp com-
155. The Anti-Stamper Association reported that "one of the principal Trading Stamp
get-rich-quick concerns [claimed] that within fourteen months from the time the company was
organized it made a cash profit of $650,000 on unredeemed stamps alone." ANTI-STAMPER
Ass'N OF N.Y., supra note 145, at 6. Editorially it added, "If that isn't bunco game, what is
it?" Id.
156. People ex rel. Appel v. Zimmerman, 102 A.D. 103 (N.Y. App. Div. 1905).
157. F. WAGGONER, supra note 146, at 95; Rubinow, supra note 136, at 583.
158. F. WAGGONER, supra note 146, at 96:
During this period of stress [when legislatures were attacking the stamp companies]
most of the trading stamp companies identified with what might be called the 'wild-
cat days' passed out of the picture. Those that remained were the far-seeing and
conservative ones who were responsible for having safely steered the business on its
legitimate course, and reinstated it to where it has recently been hailed as one of the
important stabilizers of retail prices and selling policies.
The possibility of other than legal solutions is suggested by C. S. Duncan, The Economics and
Legality of Premium Giving, 24 J. POL. ECON. 921, 950 (1916).
I did not find direct evidence of the role that Sperry & Hutchinson Co. played other
than their own claim, but it does seem clear that they would have been in a position to wield
considerable influence. In 1915-16, the company published the Sperry Magazine, with "clean,
moral readable tales," solutions for home problems, regular articles on fashions, children, and
the movies. 1 THE SPERRY MAG. 1 (No. 1, 1915). "The Little Green Stamp" intruded gently
from time to time in stories and in monthly editorials. 1 THE SPERRY MAG. 1 (No. 7, 1916).
The magazine reflected what was already a trading stamp empire, "the greatest largest pre-
mium organization in the world," 1 THE SPERRY MAG. 19 (No. 1, 1915); it advertised
"Branches Everywhere in the United States." 1 THE SPERRY MAG. 32 (Nos. 2 & 3, 1915). By
their own estimate, they distributed annually merchandise valued at close to $5,000,000. 1
THE SPERRY MAG. 20 (No. 4, 1915). The following year it was valued at $6,000,000. 1 THE
SPERRY MAO. 21 (No. 7, 1916). "In the past fifteen years the Sperry system actually has
placed in the American home merchandise the retail value of which is conservatively esti-
mated at $50,000,000." 1 THE SPERRY MAG. 1 (No. 4, 1916). This was big business and re-
mained big business within the industry.
159. 1 THE SPERRY MAG. 1 (No. 2, 1915).
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panies. The legislature enacted a statute requiring only that the
merchant giving stamps obtain the consent of the company that is-
sued the stamps and that was responsible for their redemption. 160
160. Act of May 20, 1908, ch. 428, 1908 N.Y. Laws 1221. A somewhat similar role was
likely played by the established ticket brokers when their trade was threatened. Theft of
transportation tickets and fraud in ticket sales paralleled the problem of "the wild cat days"
in the trading stamp industry. See People ez rel. Tyroler v. Warden of Prison, 157 N.Y. 116,51
N.E. 1006 (1898) (Martin, J., dissenting). Newspaper accounts of thefts are gathered in The
Business of Railway Ticket Scalping in the United States Being Unnecessary, Illegal and De-
moralizing, and Leading to Frauds upon Travelers to Daily Violations of the Interstate Com-
merce Law, Should not the Public and the Railways Join in its Supression? (undated pam-
phlet); Central Anti Ticket-Scalping Committee, Museum of Ticket Scalping Iniquity
(undated).
The New York legislation took the form of a prohibition on all ticket brokerage, with an
exception for agents authorized by the transporting companies and working out of offices at
settled addresses. Act of May 18, 1897, ch. 506, 1897 N.Y. Laws 637. The 1897 statute was
held unconstitutional in 1898. People ex rel. Tyroler v. Warden of Prison, 157 N.Y. 116, 51
N.E. 1006 (1898). It cut too broadly, prohibiting honest as well as fraudulent sales. It turned
over "to the transportation companies the selection of those who are hereafter to be permitted
to sell tickets." Id. at 122, 51 N.E. at 1008. A 1901 revised statute diminished slightly the
benefits bestowed on those who became the agents of a line, Act of May 2, 1901, ch. 639, 1901
N.Y. Laws 1531, but the prohibition on the rest of the sellers cut just as broadly. The change
was not enough to save this statute from a similar fate. It was declared unconstitutional the
same year it was passed. People ex rel. Weil v. Hagan, 35 Misc. 155, 71 N.Y.S. 461 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1901), People ex rel. Fleischman v. Caldwell, 168 N.Y. 671, aff'g, 64 A.D. 46 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1901).
One must piece together rather imaginatively the role that established ticket brokers
played in resolving the problems that evoked these two statutes. It is clear that, like Sperry
Hutchinson, the American Ticket Brokers Association represented the elite of the business.
The membership of the association consisted of 416 firms and individuals in 1893. 15 PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE FIFTEENTH ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE AMERICAN TICKET BROKERS As-
SOCIATION (Apr. 26-28, 1893) (Chicago) [hereinafter cited as PROCEEDINGS]. That group lim-
ited its membership to "men of character and means" who did not seek to enter fields that
were already occupied. Id. at 6. According to an estimate in REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF
IMMIGRATION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, 7 N.Y. SEN. Doc. No. 29, at 40 (1909) [hereinafter
cited as REPORT]: "For two hundred or three hundred authorized agents for whom the [steam-
ship] companies stand sponsors, there are probably three thousand peddlers or runners who
sell tickets for cash or on the instalment [sic] plan, on push-carts, in tenements and shops." As
early as 1893, the American Ticket Brokers Association was fighting legislation that would
affect their members by prohibiting or limiting brokerage in transportation tickets. PROCEED-
INGS, supra this note, at 7. The association, in addition to fighting hostile legislation, policed
its members, proposed arbitration to settle disputes between members, and claimed to be
conservative in granting memberships, apparently at high fees. PROCEEDINGS, supra this note,
at 8, 16 & 22.
Once the statute that would have left their futures in New York to the transportation
companies was defeated, association members could turn from that fight to another. This
involved eliminating or at least discrediting brokers who catered to the same trade as they,
but who engaged in practices that threatened the general reputation of ticket brokers. Trans-
portation lines may have complemented efforts of established brokers by authorizing greater
numbers of agents and providing some supervision over them. Increased importance in being
an authorized agent is suggested by a 1907 statute that made it a misdemeanor (and on second
violation a felony) to "advertise or hold oneself out" as the agent of any line unless so autho-
rized by the company. Act of June 21, 1907, ch. 546, § 616, 1907 N.Y. Laws 1147.
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Legislative concern for effective competition was particularly
likely to surface regarding the sale of food. The small profit margin
that was standard in food sales accentuated failures in competition,
and concern for public health provided a ready rationalization for
legislative action.1 61 A statute passed in 1887 prohibited the distri-
bution of premiums as part of a transaction in food.1 62 This time the
threatening competitor ultimately followed the legislature's direc-
tion, while those who were threatened later adopted the practice
they had opposed. To understand the reversal, one must look behind
the general prohibition of the 1887 statute.1 63
Neither accurate information about authorization nor the elimination of big-time, but
disreputable, brokers would have been much help to the poor and the immigrant. A poor
person would not have had the option to use information about the authority of a ticket bro-
ker if only the peddlers allowed installment purchases. Cf. REPORT, supra this note, at 40.
Ethnic ties, shared language and availability in the community would often have carried
greatest weight with the immigrant. The brokers of steamship tickets, whose primary clients
were immigrants, attracted further legislative attention. As with trading stamps, the legisla-
ture attended to remaining details regarding brokerage of steamship tickets.
The Immigration Commission's review in 1909 of the plight of immigrants trying to
obtain valid steamship tickets for foreign countries indicated that conditions were improved
after 1907. "This is partly due to the few incoming aliens and to a great reduction in the sale of
prepaid tickets. The number of agents issuing personal orders has been reduced, and there is
generally more care in the conduct of the business by peddlers." REPORT, supra this note, at
43. On the other hand, the complaints of immigrants to the Legal Aid Bureau at the Educa-
tional Alliance in 1908 confirmed that, indeed, "there [were] still grave irregularities. . ....
REPORT, supra this note, at 41. The remaining legislation on ticket brokerage tracked the
problems reported by the Immigration Commission. Licenses to sell transportation tickets or
orders for transportation to or from foreign countries were required for all but authorized
agents of the relevant line. A bond of $2000 and a fee of $25 payable annually were conditions
to becoming licensed. Act of May 23, 1910, ch. 349, 1910 N.Y. Laws 622. The Comptroller
issued 10 licenses in 1910 and began an investigation to determine whether unlicensed sellers
were still operating. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMPTROLLER FOR 1910,3 N.Y. ASSEMBLY Doc.
No. 10, at 62 (1911). A prohibition on advertising or holding oneself out "as authorized or
entitled to sell steamship tickets without first having procured a license" was added in 1911 by
Act of June 30, 1911, ch. 578, 1911 N.Y. Laws 1334.
161. The argument against the distribution of premiums with sales of food was cast in
terms of health, but doing so required some straining. Judge Peckham summarized the argu-
ment made to him in People v. Gillson, 109 N.Y. 389, 403, 17 N.E. 343, 348 (1888):
The reasoning of counsel for the People is based upon the theory that no one will sell,
as a matter of permanent business, an article at a price below what it costs him to
procure it, and if he sells his coffee (in this instance), as low as the price thereof with
other dealers, when he adds a gift at the time of sale, he thereby reduces his profits
below that of his competitor, and in order to prevent such a loss he will necessarily
and inevitably sell an inferior or adultered article.
162. Act of June 24, 1887, ch. 691, 1887 N.Y. Laws 898.
163. Behind the general prohibition of the statute one finds the Great Atlantic and
Pacific Tea Company. Surely others eventually presented a similar threat, but it was A&P
that was consistently attacked in The American Grocer, and the constitutionality of the stat-
ute was tested on the basis of a purchase from A&P. In Bullock, The Early History of the Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company, 11 HARv. Bus. REV. 289 (Mar.-Apr. 1933) [hereinafter cited
as Bullock I], Roy Bullock describes the difficulties of doing research on businesses in general
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The retail trade in groceries in the 1880's was "quite atomis-
tic" 164 in structure. Grocery stores were relatively small and defined
their clientele by neighborhood. The chain grocery store or super-
market, which could purchase a range of groceries in bulk, was not
yet on the scene. The grocery trade in the neighborhood store was
characterized by a low profit margin on most items, with a long
profit on tea and coffee. 165 The structure of competition between
grocers within a neighborhood, according to grocery lore, was set by
certain comodities: "Any grocer will tell you that the three basic
commodities in his store are eggs, butter, and coffee. If the eggs are
good and the butter is good and, above all, if the coffee is good, the
customers will return for more. And they will take the canned soup
and the noodles with them." 166
The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company (A&P) operated
outside that structure when it bought in bulk and eliminated the
middleman. 167 A&P first competed for coffee and tea sales through
its mail order club plans and then increasingly through its chain
stores, which may have numbered as many as 135 by 1885.168 In
addition to buying coffee and tea in bulk, A&P had begun to buy
premiums in bulk. Chromo and chinaware were the lure to custom-
ers at what came to be termed "gift tea stores."' 169
and of working on A&P in particular. The problem with A&P was compounded by the fact
that the partnership that controlled the company between 1878 and 1901 was particularly
hesitant to put things in writing. Even the partnership agreement was oral. See Bullock, A
History of the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company since 1878, 12 HARv. Bus. REV. 59,61,63
(Sept.-Oct. 1933) [hereinafter cited as Bullock II].
164. J. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 441 (1959); Cf. Rubinow, supra note 136, at
582.
165. 2 J. REES, THE GROCERY TRADE - IT'S HISTORY AND ROMANCE 242 (1910); Bul-
lock I, supra note 163, at 295.
166. FORTUNE'S FAVORITES: PORTRAITS OF SOME AMERICAN CORPORATIONS 155, 156
(1931).
167. 10 HARPERS WEEKLY 687 (Oct. 27, 1866) (advertisement for A&P):
The proprietors became fully convinced, several years ago, that the consumers of
Tea and Coffee were paying too many and too large profits on these articles of every-
day consumption, and therefore organized THE GREAT AMERICAN TEA COMPANY to
do away, as far as possible, with these enormous drains upon the Consumers, and to
supply them with these necessaries at the smallest possible price.
We propose to do away with all these various profits and brokerages, cartages,
storages, cooperages, and waste, with the exception of a small commission paid for
purchasing to our correspondents in China and Japan, one cartage, and a small profit
to ourselves-which, on our large sales, will amply pay us.
168. Bullock II, supra note 163, at 61.
169. As described in Bullock II, supra note 163, at 60. The date is set in "the 1860's" in
Boom in Premiums, Bus. WK., May 14, 1958, at 27-28. Bullock II, supra note 163, at 60,
seems to date the practice in the 1870's, drawing, e.g., on advertisements such as that in The
N.Y. Tribune, Dec. 22, 1871, at 8. See also Biggest Family Business, 7 FORTUNE 53, 55 (Mar.
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A&P's market claim was brought home to the consumer by
heavy advertising in periodicals.' 7 ° It was brought home to the
neighborhood grocer with particular force when, in the 1880's, A&P
began employing peddlers in wagons to solicit orders door to door in
towns throughout the country.171 The peddlers, who so effectively
carried A&P's message, also began to carry more than just coffee
and tea. In 1884, sugar was advertised at cost.' 72 "Pure Elgin
Creamery Butter" and "A&P Baking Powder" were added by
1890.171 "We got into the grocery business gradually"' 7 4 -but
surely in time to compound the threat created by the appearance of
the peddlers.' 71 Other tea and coffee companies followed suit,'
7 6
but, of these, A&P enjoyed the particular enmity of grocers who
considered it an ethical and economic affront to the honest neighbor-
hood grocer. 177
Something more than honest competition was required to re-
move the affront that A&P constituted, for A&P and the then stan-
dard neighborhood grocery were structured so differently that the
grocer could not compete with the combination of bulk purchases
and premiums. Accordingly, "the honest wholesale and retail trade
of the state had to ask for the relief the bill [prohibiting the giving of
premiums in the sale of food] afforded."' 78 The relief sought was
from a practice that A&P had pioneered and that it might have been
1933). Bullock II, supra note 163, at 64, reports that "[t]he giving of premiums [by A&P] had
grown so that in 1900 the annual outlay for gifts to customers amounted to $450,000. . ....
170. Bullock I, supra note 163, at 292.
171. Id., at 295.
172. CLEVELAND DIRECTORY CO., CLEVELAND DIRECTORY 244 (1884).
173. HOLBROOK's NEWARK CITY AND BUSINESS DIRECTORY 501 (1890).
174. Bullock II, supra note 163, at 62, drawing on the testimony of John A. Hartford,
President of the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company, in his testimony in the case of United
States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106 (1932).
175. The expanded line was carried by the peddlers and was also available in the stores.
Bullock II, supra note 163, at 62, draws on HOLBROOK's NEWARK CITY AND BUSINESS DIREC-
TORY 501 (1891) for "[ain advertisement of 1890 [which] states that a list of grocery items
including Thea-Nectar, A&P Baking Powder and Eight O'Clock Breakfast Coffee were 'For
Sale at all our Stores and From our Wagons."' Id.
176. Bullock II, supra note 163, at 62; Boom in Premiums, supra note 169, at 27.
177. Bullock I, supra note 163, at 293-96. "The Great American Tea Company, al-
though thoroughly hated, had become a national institution." Id. at 294. The American Gro-
cer began a series of attacks on the company within a year of its founding in 1869. Id. at 293.
178. Respondent's Brief at 27, Record on Appeal, People v. Gilison, 109 N.Y. 389, 17
N.E. 343 (1888).
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expected to expand. 1 79 A&P promptly initiated a test case.18 0 In
holding the statute unconstitutional, the New York Court of Ap-
peals determined that the parties would have to resolve this dispute
in the market as it existed or change the market if they could. Gro-
cers tried giving premiums, but did not find that practice effective
against A&P, which could order its premiums as well as its groceries
in bulk. 8 '
The competition that the legislature had tried to impose was
ultimately ensured, not by the grocers, but by A&P and by the ap-
pearance of trading stamps. A&P completed its expansion into a full
line of groceries. This made the range of purchasing to be rewarded
with premiums the same for A&P and for the neighborhood grocery
store.18 2 Trading stamps appeared and eliminated much of the dis-
parity between the premiums that A&P and the neighborhood gro-
cer could give. 1 83 By changing its own structure, A&P helped pro-
duce the equivalence in competitive position that the original
statute had sought, though this equivalence was manifested by
everyone, rather than no one, giving premiums.
To reclaim a special competitive position, A&P, and others like
it, eventually shifted to the "no frills" store-no deliveries, no
charges and no premiums."8 4 The chain stores grounded their mar-
179. Respondent's Brief constructs a hypothetical in which 'A' sells wholesome "pure
coffee, tea, saleratus or baking powder [which] could not compete with the adulterated and
short rate product of 'B', that gave the consumer a watch or a silver spoon, or a complete
dinner set with every purchase .. " Id. at 20.
180. The prosecution that led to the statute being declared unconstitutional involved
the sale of two pounds of coffee by Hugh Gillson at the salesroom of the Great Atlantic &
Pacific Tea Company, 11 North Pearl Street, in Albany. "[T]he business sign read 'Great
Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company'; the other sign read 'Try our 8 o'clock breakfast coffee,
checks given away with this coffee." Redirect Examination of Eugene Rest, the prosecuting
witness, Record on Appeal, People v. Gillson, 109 N.Y. 389, 396, 17 N.E. 343, 344-45 (1888).
The witness added, "I did not buy this coffee for my own use. I bought it to make a case
against the tea companies." Id.
181. Rubinow, supra note 136, at 581-86.
182. W. MUELLER & L. GARIOAN, CHANGES IN MARKET STRUCTURE OF GROCERY RE-
TAILING 16 (1961) assert that A&P "by 1865 had added a line of groceries." Id. Most writers
date the move somewhat later. See supra note 169, for a 1890 description. Bullock II, supra
note 163, at 65, describes a photograph of the interior of the A&P store at 1205 Market Street
in Philadelphia, printed in 7 TEA & COFFEE TRADE J. 15 (Nov. 1904), showing an extensive
display of packaged grocery items. By 1910, The American Grocer, in giving examples of price
cutting, listed an extensive A&P inventory of packaged products and canned goods. 83 AM.
GROCER, Jan. 5, 1910, at 10; 83 AM. GROCER, Jan. 8, 1910, at 10.
183. H. Fox, THE ECONOMICS OF TRADING STAMPS 34 (1968). Rubinow, supra note 136,
at 583-84, describes the advantage that businesses who could purchase very large numbers of
stamps still held.
184. In 1912 or 1913, at the peak of premium popularity, A&P developed the "economy
store." FORTUNE'S FAVORITES, supra note 166, at 151; M. ADELMAN, A&P: A STUDY IN PRICE-
COST BEHAVIOR AND PUBLIC POLICY (1959); see also Biggest Family Business, supra note 169.
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keting squarely on their bulk purchasing power.1 8 5 Thus, having al-
ready helped produce the competition the statute had tried to im-
pose, A&P approximated the form of the original statute by not
giving premiums. Ironically, it was the neighborhood grocers who,
for some years, remained caught by the consumers' expectation that
premiums would be given. 186
Businesses in competition responded to statutes at levels apart
from constitutionality; they read a statute for what it might tell
about the calculus of competition. Once established, a viable com-
petitive practice continued even when no longer statutorily re-
quired. Statutory prohibition of competitive practices, despite sub-
sequent invalidation, raised doubts about the ultimate competitive
value of the practice and provided the occasion for leaders in the
practice to restructure the market. In so doing, they tended to con-
form the facts toward the legislature's original design.
4. INVALIDATION OF THE BASIS FOR LEGISLATIVE CHOICE
Legislative decisionmaking could be somewhat casual and un-
critical when a proposal was offered for the good of the public,
aroused no opposition, and required neither legislative supervision
nor public funding. This was the case in New York with statutes
limiting entry into a variety of occupations. When the courts de-
clared those statutes unconstitutional, they destroyed the factual
assumptions on which the legislature's initial choice had been made.
Whether these instances constitute real opposition of court and leg-
islature depends on whether the statute could have survived serious
legislative scrutiny when it was proposed."8 '
In New York, the courts invalidated at least some of the occu-
In 1915, 554 of 938 A&P stores were run on the "economy plan." Bullock II, supra note 163, at
66.
185. Thus, for the chain stores, the issue became "Chain Store v. Manufacturer or
Chain Store v. Wholesaler"-no longer chain store v. independent. FORTUNE'S FAVORITES,
supra note 166, at 146.
186. Bullock II, supra note 163, at 66.
187. Lawrence Friedman, Freedom of Contract and Occupational Licensing 1890-1910: A
Legal and Social Study, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 487 (1965) wrote "a legal and social study" of
occupational licensing in an effort "to arrive at a better understanding of judicial review of
economic and social legislation during the critical period between 1890 and 1910." Id. at 487.
He was "in search of a general theory." Id. at 525. Friedman chose occupational licensing
cases, because they were not so fraught with high emotion and therefore might provide "a
kind of control group of decisions to test our explanations of the behavior of the judges in
matters of high constitutional controversy." Id. at 489. In his attempt to generalize from
occupational licensing, Friedman chose the only group of cases, at least in New York, in which
the courts thoroughly prevailed for a significant period in constitutional choices made under
open-ended provisions.
626
1983:583 Beyond Cases 627
pational protections that had been obtained by horseshoers, under-
takers, plumbers and insurance brokers."' 8 Horseshoers and under-
takers had obtained the legislative requirement of a license, to be
granted to future applicants only after an examination and a sub-
stantial apprenticeship with a licensed member. The legislature em-
powered examining boards, consisting largely of practicing members
of the occupation, to administer the scheme.1"9 Plumbers had ob-
tained these provisions and the additional requirement that "every
member of a co-partnership shall have been registered. . . .,9 In-
surance brokers were able to have the required licenses limited to
those persons who made insurance brokerage their principal busi-
ness.
19 1
Those seeking protection for their occupations first had to over-
come legislative disinterest. "In New York the committee in charge
of the first [horseshoers] bill submitted to the legislature, were told
to go home and pave the way for the future craft."' 92 Disinterest
188. Similarly, a statute protecting New York farmers was declared unconstitutional
in People v. Windholz, 92 A.D. 569 (N.Y. App. Div. 1904), an action against a nonfarmer.
The statute provided New York farmers with a more favorable standard for determining
adulteration of cider vinegar made "exclusively from applies grown on [their own] land ....
Act of Apr. 10, 1893, ch. 338, 1893 N.Y. Laws 655, as amended by Act of Apr. 10, 1901, ch.
308, 1901 N.Y. Laws 813.
189. Act of May 13, 1897, ch. 415, § 180, 1897 N.Y. Laws 461,498. That statute regard-
ing horseshoers applied only to cities of the first and second class. It was extended throughout
the state by Act of May 10, 1899, ch. 558, 1899 N.Y. Laws 1145. Embalmers had been licensed
since 1898. Success on the examination was the only requirement for licensing. Act of Apr. 26,
1898, ch. 555, 1898 N.Y. Laws 299, amended by Act of Apr. 17, 1899, ch. 324, 1899 N.Y. Laws
701, to extend the time for those already practicing to register. There was never any difficulty
with the constitutionality of that provision. In 1904, however, the statute was amended to
require undertakers to be licensed. To qualify, the candidate had to be licensed as an em-
balmer and to have been "employed as an assistant to a licensed undertaker continuously for a
period of at least three years." Act of Apr. 29, 1904, ch. 498, 1904 N.Y. Laws 1260, amended
by Act of May 19, 1905, ch. 572, 1905 N.Y. Laws 1267, to extend the time for practicing
undertakers to register. To meet constitutional objections, the apprenticeship was diminished
to two years and the examination was separated from that for embalmers.
190. Act of May 21, 1896, ch. 803, 1896 N.Y. Laws 1053. The original licensing require-
ment had been upheld in People ex rel. Nechamcus v. Warden, 144 N.Y. 529, 39 N.E. 686
(1895).
191. An insurance broker was required to apply for a certificate of authority from the
superintendent of insurance. Act of July 24, 1911, ch. 748, 1911 N.Y. Laws 2008, as amended
by Act of Feb. 7, 1912, ch. 1, 1912 N.Y. Laws 1. The application had to set forth that "the
applicant is engaged or intends to engage in good faith, principally in the insurance business or
that he intends to conduct such business with a real estate agency or real estate brokerage
business. ... Act of Feb. 7, 1912, ch. 1, § 142(d), 1912 N.Y. Laws 1. This amendment had
changed the requirement from being engaged "principally in the insurance brokerage busi-
ness" to being engaged "principally in the insurance business." Act of Feb. 7, 1912, ch. 1, §
142(d), 1912 N.Y. Laws 1.
192. Buckley, "Legislation"-How Best to Obtain It, REPORT OF THE EIGHTH ANNuAL
CONVENTION OF THE NATIONAL BLACKSMITHS' AND WELDERS' ASSOCIATION 70 (1899).
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was countered by facts, conveyed by a "horseshoer educator." 193
Both the public and the legislature were to be educated:
[If we awaken the people as to the depths which it is necessary to de-
scend for a complete discharge of the obligations resting on the scientific
horseshoer, if we would show that the ignorant and incompetent of the
trade refused to take notice of the studies opened to them thus leaving
the line of demarcation a plain one, then the people would know wherein
our basis of justice lay and would undoubtedly give their support to the
demands that we would make. . . We constantly awaited on the se-
lected representatives of the state, showed them wherein the justice of
our plaint lay, led them into the intricacies of our art and enveloped
them with a sense of the wrong that we suffered as workers at the hands
of the unscrupulous and incompetent. 1
94
No one offered the legislature a different set of facts. Grandfather
clauses ensured the licensing of all contemporary practitioners; the
group that would suffer exclusion under the apprenticeship require-
ments did not yet exist.' 95
Horseshoers' claims that restrictive licensing was "destined to
bring gladness to the horse and benefit to humanity"' 96 may have
raised the necessary legislative interest to pass the bill, but those
claims hardly raised legislative interest to the level of searching crit-
icism. Legislators did not seem to be making any real commitment,
for in passing the statute they were incurring no continuing respon-
sibility. Once in place, the licensing scheme was financed from appli-
cation fees and run by members of the occupation.' 97
The "education" came unstuck when contrary sets of facts were
presented to the courts by persons thereafter excluded from prac-
tice. Edward J. Harrison could not become a licensed undertaker,
nor could Samuel Beattie be a licensed horseshoer, unless a licensed
member of the respective trade agreed to take each as an appren-
tice.' 98 Robert Schnaier could not recover for plumbing work per-
193. Id. at 70.
194. Id. at 71, 73. This description is of the efforts of the National Blacksmiths' and
Welders' Association with the Michigan legislature. Buckley suggests that "[a] professor of
law is, to my mind, the proper person to entrust with the work [of drafting a bill], the cost of
service being first obtained." Id. at 72.
195. E.g., Act of May 19, 1905, ch. 572, 1905 N.Y. Laws 1267.
196. Buckley, supra note 192, at 73.
197. E.g., Act of May 12, 1899, ch. 558, §§ 181-183, 1899 N.Y. Laws 1145.
198. The 1904 statute was declared unconstitutional in People v. Ringe, 197 N.Y. 143,
90 N.E. 451 (1910). Act of July 28,1911, ch. 841, 1911 N.Y. Laws 2356, required undertakers
to have a license if they wanted to practice as "certified undertaker[s]." Id. All undertakers
currently practicing could be so certified. Thereafter aspiring certified undertakers had to
serve as an apprentice or assistant to an undertaker "for at least two years in the aggregate."
Id. The statute was amended by Act of Mar. 11, 1913, ch. 71, 1913 N.Y. Laws 122, to provide
for separate embalming and undertaking examinations. An apprenticeship, though only two
628
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formed because his partner, whose "duties as a member of the firm
were confined exclusively to attending to the financial affairs of the
firm and keeping the books, '  was not licensed as a plumber.2"'
William Hauser, who was a lawyer and also was certified as a "first
class broker" by the New York Fire Insurance Exchange, could not
obtain a certificate of authority under provisions that required full
time work in brokerage and thus could not collect his commis-
sions. 20 1 Each argued to the courts that these statutory protections
were anticompetitive, and the courts declared each statute uncon-
stitutional.20 2 With the facts in on both sides, the judicial decisions
years in the aggregate, was also required in every instance. The 1913 statute was held uncon-
stitutional in People v. Harrison, 170 A.D. 802, 808 (N.Y. App. Div. 1915), because "[t]he
statute still requires that the requisite skill and knowledge shall be obtained in a particular
manner ....... Id. (emphasis in original). The horseshoeing statute was held unconstitu-
tional in People v. Beattie, 96 A.D. 383 (N.Y. App. Div. 1904).
199. Schnaier v. Navarre Hotel & Importation Co., 182 N.Y. 83, 83, 74 N.E. 561,561
(1905) (emphasis added). Judge Gray concurred in the result, but questioned whether the
statute required that reading. The court, in Milton Schnaier & Co. v. Grigsby, 132 A.D. 854
(N.Y. App. Div. 1909), construed the statute so as to hold it constitutional.
200. See supra note 199.
201. Hauser v. North British & Mercantile Ins. Co., 206 N.Y. 455,458, 100 N.E. 52,52
(1912). The "first class broker's certificate [from New York Fire Insurance Exchange] entitled
him to receive commissions, or brokerage, as a fire insurance broker, to be paid by the mem-
bers of the exchange, of which defendant was one, upon his placing insurance with them." Id.
202. As Justice Chase observed in People v. Ringe, 197 N.Y. 143, 151,90 N.E. 451,454
(1910):
We cannot refrain from the thought that the act in question [requiring aspiring un-
dertakers to be apprenticed to a licensed undertaker] was conceived and promulgated
in the interests of those then engaged in the undertaking business and that the rela-
tion which the business bears to the general health, morals and welfare of the state
had much less influence upon its originators than the prospective monopoly that
could be exercised with the aid of its provisions.
His suspicion may have been reinforced by the choice of the New York State Undertakers
Association to submit a brief in support of the statute.
Justice Chase's suspicion is also reinforced by details of the passage of similar statutes.
The defendant plumbing firm in Schnaier v. Navarre Hotel & Importation Co., 182 N.Y. 83,
74 N.E. 561 (1905), argued that:
The effect of the laws of 1896 [requiring all members of a partnership that did plumb-
ing work to be licensed] will necessarily be to partially destroy the plumbing busi-
ness. It will tend to create a greater monopoly in this line of business than the legisla-
tors intended. It would place a premium upon licensed plumbers who are fortunate
enough to have capital at their command. This, of necessity, would prevent and
practically deprive the poor licensed plumber from engaging in that business, more
especially in these days when trades and businesses can only be profitably carried on
with large capital at the command of the business.
Defendant's Brief at 25, Schnaier v. Navarre Hotel & Importation Co., 182 N.Y. 83, 74 N.E.
561 (1905). The Insurance Brokers' Association of the City of New York declared itself, "vi-
tally interested [in the appeal of Hauser v. North British & Mercantile Ins. Co., 206 N.Y. 455,
100 N.E. 52 (1912)] in the determination of the questions involved in this action [against an
insurance broker who also worked as a lawyer]. . . ... Brief Submitted on Behalf of Insurance
Brokers' Ass'n of The City of New York, at 1, Hauser v. North British & Mercantile Ins. Co.,
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invalidating these sorts of protections were the last words to be
heard-and this time the last that were uttered.2 °3
D. Crossing Categories
Categories are necessary to make sense of a mass of detail. Ef-
forts to identify similarities within categories and differences among
them help generate explanations. Having moved from the relatively
ready categories of the common law to the complex and unfamiliar
ground beyond cases, I expected difficulty in developing categories
that would readily account for all that I had found. I was not disap-
pointed. The issue of tenement manufacture, which earlier served to
show the shift from special toward general legislation,204 stubbornly
combines all the configurations of issues that were carefully sepa-
rated into the four categories of interaction in the preceding section.
Thus tenement manufacture provides both a review of those catego-
ries and the impetus to move beyond them.20 5
206 N.Y. 455, 100 N.E. 52 (1912). The trial judge in People v. Windholz, 92 A.D. 569 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1904) asked, "Why was this provision [setting a lower adulteration standard for the
cider vinegar of New York farmers] placed there?" Id. Defendant's attorney replied, "Be-
cause they couldn't pass the act without the farmer vote." Id. By contrast the Central Law
Journal was inclined to treat such legislation as "sumptuary or paternalistic legislation at-
tempting to regulate the details of purely private matters." Unconstitutional Regulation of
Trades, 60 CENT. L.J. 101, 103 (1905).
203. In Act of May 27, 1913, ch. 754, 1913 N.Y. Laws 1890, the legislature passed what
was described by the court in Gottesman v. Barer, 89 Misc. 440, 152 N.Y.S. 128 (1915), as "a
substantial reenactment of Laws [of] 1896, Ch. 803" which had been taken to require all mem-
bers of a plumbing partnership to be licensed. Id. at 442, 152 N.Y.S. at 129. However, the
constitutional problem was skirted by the addition of two references to "performing" work, §§
415(a) & 416(a); and by providing that one could register without being a licensed plumber.
However, only a licensed plumber could obtain a certificate of registration. See Fredericks v.
Lederer, 126 Misc. 184, 212 N.Y.S. 614 (Sup. Ct. 1925).
204. See supra notes 37-54 and accompanying text.
205. A similar review can be accomplished using the controversy over the sale of marga-
rine. Health concerns surfaced readily. Carbonates of potash, soda, or ammonia, and sulphu-
ric, nitric, benzoic, and salicylic acids were used in rendering oleo oil. E. WIEST, THE BUTTER
INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES, AN ECONOMIC STUDY OF BUTTER AND OLEO MARGARINE
219-23 (Studies in History, Economics and Public Law No. 165, 1916). Manufacturers of
oleomargarine had occasion to deny to the New York Committee on Public Health that they
used fats from diseased animals. Id. at 227.
Though the division may not have reflected reality, butter tended to be thought of as an
agricultural product and the making of oleomargarine as an industry. W. PABST, BUTTER AND
OLEOMARGARINE: AN ANALYSIS OF COMPETING COMMODITIES 28 (Studies in History, Eco-
nomics and Public Law No. 427, 1937). "Thousands of small independent manufacturers were
engaged in buttermaking [almost exclusively on the farms], and they felt their livelihood was
threatened by the rise of margarine. For this was not only an industrial product; the main part
of it soon began to come from large slaughterhouses, from 'big business."' J. VAN
STUYVENBERG, MARGARINE: AN ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND SCIENTIFIC HISTORY 1869-1969, at
283 (1969). The intensity of the battles between producers of butter and margarine were not
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The tenement manufacture statute that was held unconstitu-
tional had been plain enough: "The manufacture of cigars in any
tenement house is prohibited . .. "0' The opinion of the court of
appeals was equally clear: "What does this act attempt to do? In
form, it makes it a crime for a cigarmaker in New York and Brook-
lyn . . . to carry on a perfectly lawful trade in his home."2 °7 There
unlike those over the eight-hour day. But unlike the eight-hour day, which was vital to a
broad range of the population, the choice between butter and margarine was not so fundamen-
tal that it elicited such a clear-cut resolution.
Access to the market was the overriding issue. Margarine was a new product on the
market, having been developed in France in 1867, E. WIEST, supra this note, at 214. It pro-
vided a substitute for butter at about half the price. People v. Marx, 99 N.Y. 377, 381, 2 N.E.
29, 30 (1885). The first effort to limit the sale of margarine by requiring it to be labeled as such,
Act of June 5, 1877, ch. 415, 1877 N.Y. Laws 441; Act of May 27, 1880, ch. 439, 1880 N.Y.
Laws 639; Act of May 30, 1882, ch. 238, 1882 N.Y. Laws 291, was replaced in 1884 by a
prohibition on the manufacture of "any article designed to take the place of butter or cheese
produced from pure, unadulterated milk or cream. . . ... Act of Apr. 24, 1884, ch. 202, 1884
N.Y. Laws 255. A year later, the legislature prohibited manufacture "in imitation or sem-
blance of natural butter or cheese," Act of Apr. 30, 1885, ch. 183, 1885 N.Y. Laws 338, and
combined it with the prohibition on items "designed to take the place of natural butter or
cheese." Id. The 1885 understudy was barely in place before the 1884 prohibition was held
unconstitutional. People v. Marx, 99 N.Y. 377, 385, 2 N.E. 29, 34 (1885). By the time the
constitutionality of the 1885 prohibition of imitation was confirmed in 1887, People v. Aren-
sburg, 105 N.Y. 123, 11 N.E. 277 (1887), that statute had been tightened to prevent a seller's
escape by the claim that he thought he was selling fine creamery butter, Act of June 4, 1886,
ch. 557, § 7, 1886 N.Y. Laws 780, and its prohibition had been extended to the furnishing of
prohibited items in bakeries, hotels, taverns, boardinghouses, restaurants, saloons, lunch
counters or places of public entertainment. Act of June 16, 1887, ch. 583, 1887 N.Y. Laws 794.
In 1893, a prohibition was added on coloring "for the purpose or with the effect of imparting
thereto . . . any shade of yellow butter or cheese." Act of Apr. 10, 1893, ch. 338, 1893 N.Y.
Laws 655. Other gaps in the prohibition of the imitation of butter were eliminated in an elabo-
rated statute in 1902.
Dairy farmers' traditional occupational identity may have helped ensure their initial
solidarity in fighting margarine. Some strains on that solidarity seem to have been produced
by the competing needs of distinguishing butter from margarine while matching (or at least
approaching) its price and shelf life. C. Simmonds reports in Simmonds, The Adulteration of
Butter, 73 NATURE 466, 466 (1906) that "[d]uring the past few years much unscrupulous inge-
nuity has been applied to the sophistication of butter. . . . Considerable profits are alleged to
be made, and it is therefore not surprising that the traffic has flourished in spite of all attempts
at suppression." Suppression in New York took the form of statutes prohibiting, inter alia, use
of most preservatives in butter (and the mixing of animal fats with milk in making butter).
Act of Apr. 10 1893, ch. 338, 1893 N.Y. Laws 655, as amended by Act of Apr. 19, 1900, ch. 534,
1900 N.Y. Laws 1245. Simmonds, supra this note, describes in detail the latter process and the
difficulty of detecting it.
The statute's prohibition on preservatives in butter was held unconstitutional in People
v. Biesecker, 169 N.Y. 53, 61 N.E. 990 (1901). The tension just described within the dairy
industry was increasing as consumption and acceptance of margarine increased and may help
explain why the prohibition on preservatives did not reappear in the session laws.
206. Act of May 12, 1884, ch. 272, 1884 N.Y. Laws 335. There were some exceptions in
the statute. Violation constituted a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of $10-$100 and by
imprisonment for from ten days to six months.
207. In re Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98 (1885). C. JACOBS, supra note 34, at 51, characterizes the
opinion as "one of the most extreme judicial statements of laissez faire. . . ." Id. He adds
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the clarity ends.
Progressive reformers saw the underlying problems of tenement
manufacture as child labor and unhealthy working conditions. The
latter endangered consumers of tenement-made goods as well as the
occupants of the tenements.20 8 These reformers considered child
welfare and cleanliness to be settled values like honesty in bulk sales
or sobriety in dance halls. For them the answer to the problems of
tenement manufacture lay in prohibiting all such manufacture.20 9
Those who held a contrary view could not match the established
voice of these reformers. 210 Tenement workers, for example, while
opposed to the economic impositions on them, sometimes preferred
work at home. It gave women, who were the bulk of tenement labor-
ers, needed work even though they had to care for young children. It
coincided with preindustrial modes of work, allowing some personal
control of pace, schedule and associates.211 But these workers,
neither organized nor influential, were in no better position to detail
that it is perhaps for that reason that the opinion "acquired in later years a certain preemi-
nence in the world of citation." Id. B. Twiss, supra note 18, at 99-109, details the argument of
the case and confirms its prominence: the "decision was cited thereafter probably more than
any other single state decision in practically every case where state power over individual
liberty and property rights was challenged." Id. at 99.
208. R. LUBOV, THE PROGRESSIVES AND THE SLUMS: TENEMENT HOUSE REFORM IN
NEW YORK CITY 1890-1917 (1962); Sergeant, Toilers in the Tenements, Where the Beautiful
Things of the Great Shops are Made, 35 MCCLURE'S MAG. 231 (July 1910); Van Kleeck, Child
Labor in New York City Tenements, CHARITIES AND THE COMMONS 1405 (Jan. 18, 1908).
209. Van Kleeck, supra note 208, at 1420, argues that "[tjhe nature of this system of
industry is such that its evils are its essence. . . . To abolish the evils means to abolish the
system; to 'regulate' the system means nothing." However, this manufacture was not prohib-
ited; licenses were required instead. "Under the terms of a decision which was rendered some
years ago by the Court of Appeals . . ., it is impossible to prevent the making of clothing or
other articles by families in their living apartments, and the Factory Law was framed so as not
to clash with this view of our highest court." EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FACTORY IN-
SPECTOR OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK FOR 1893, at 11 (1894). White, Effects of New York Sweat
Shop Law, 18 GUNTON'S MAG. 345 (1900) must have been unaware of this permit scheme for
family manufacture, for he suggests that, "[t]his decision [Jacobs] for a time baffled every
attempt to bring the home shops under the authority of the factory inspector, until the way
was pointed out by the Massachusetts licensing law of 1898." Id. at 347-48.
210. One of the reformers, Florence Kelley, had served "as special agent for the Bureau
of Labor Statistics of Illinois for an investigation of the needle-trades in the tenements of
Chicago . . .; as Chief Inspector of Factories of that state . . .; as agent in charge of the
Chicago division of the investigation of the 'Slums of Great Cities' for the Department of
Labor at Washington; and as Secretary of the National Consumers League from 1899. . ....
Preface to F. KELLEY, SOME ETHICAL GAINS THROUGH LEGISLATION (1905).
211. H. GUTMAN, WORK, CULTURE AND SOCIETY IN INDUSTRIALIZING AMERICA, ESSAYS
IN AMERICAN WORKING CLASS AND SOCIAL HISTORY (1976). I am exploring this further in
research funded by the American Council of Learned Societies.
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that preference than they would have been to argue the benefits of
dance hall entertainment.
Labor unions and management disagreed about the process of
subcontracting in tenement manufacture. Cigarmaking and other
manufacture increasingly came into the tenements through a con-
tractor or subcontractor who set the piecework wage and provided
materials. This process of subcontracting, often through several
levels, was described by labor unions as "the process of grinding the
faces of the poor."2" 2 While tenement manufacture might occur in,
and help produce, unhealthy work places, it was, in their eyes, par-
ticularly characterized by progressively lowered payment to the
worker for the amount of work done.213 Limitations on this process
of contracting, like an imposed eight-hour day or compensation
without proof of fault, would have been a highly disputed change in
the legal construct of freedom of contract.
Among cigar manufacturers, the issue was competition. The use
made of tenement labor varied by the structure of a manufacturer's
operation. Some manufacturers worked without established facto-
ries and entirely by subcontracting. 2 4 They were dependent on
home workers in the same way that trading stamp companies de-
pended on the survival of their product. Those manufacturers with
factories who did some subcontracting could accomodate a statu-
tory prohibition on tenement manufacture by moving all work into
an existing or expanded factory.2 15 Once accommodation occurred,
the continued existence of the statute, like that requiring the sale of
212. Speech by New York Deputy Inspector McKay, in EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE FACTORY INSPECTOR, supra note 209, at 789. The functioning of the process is described in
that report. Id. at 11. It is reported that, "[t]heir [tenement manufacture workers] pay has
been cut from twenty to forty per cent and the difficulty of keeping soul and body together
upon the now meagre returns for their labor can be readily imagined." Id. at 66. The problem
continued the following year: "The continued depression in business, extensive and pro-
tracted strikes, lockouts, and perhaps, other causes, demoralized the clothing trade to such an
extent that constant and unremitting vigilance was required to check violations of the law."
NINTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FACTORY INSPECTOR OF THE STATE OF NEw YORK FOR 1894,
at 16 (1895). See also ELEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FACTORY INSPECTOR OF THE STATE
OF NEW YORK FOR 1896, at 24 (1897).
213. NINTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FACTORY INSPECTOR OF THE STATE OF NEW
YORK, supra note 212, at 876:
The contractors, naturally, in order to keep up, if possible, to the figure of profit they
have set as the least amount which they must clear up as the result of a week's work,
turn to the workman and cut the price paid to him, or if the contractor, as is often the
custom, sublets the work to another less favored individual he extracts, in advance
the amount which as a broker he claims to be his due. It needs no elaboration to show
what would be the result of this system of cut and slash.
214. K. BRAUN, UNION MANAGEMENT CO-OPERATION-EXPERIENCE IN THE CLOTHING
INDUSTRY 31 (1947).
215. White, supra note 209, at 347, describes indirect effects of inspection:
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mileage books, would become largely irrelevant.
Cigarmakers who rolled and shaped their product by hand were
the elite within their occupation.2 6 With the introduction of molds,
the handworkers faced increasing competition from the often un-
skilled tenement workers.2 17 In its fight to limit or control mechani-
zation, the cigarmakers' union considered the tenement workers be-
yond its reach 21 S and attempted to exclude them from the
occupation through statutory prohibition.21 9 This prohibition on
tenement cigarmaking would have given skilled cigarmakers some
of the same protection that horseshoers, plumbers, undertakers and
insurance brokers sought to obtain by restrictive licensing.
In trying, without success, to resolve the dilemmas posed by
tenement manufacture, the legislature transformed the issue into
one that was more manageable and less volatile. Through successive
efforts it created an elaborate administrative structure around the
court's decision that prohibition of tenement manufacture was un-
constitutional.2 2 ° Tenement manufacture could be limited, if not
[I]t is by making it inconvenient for a manufacturer to resort to the indirect or con-
tract method, and uncomfortable for those employed in it, that the system would in
time be discarded altogether, and the work done in regular shops which could readily
be brought under the supervision of the factory inspectors and within the influence of
the trade unions.
216. I. YEOWITZ, INDUSTRIALIZATION AND THE AMERIcAN LABOR MOVEMENT 1850-
1900, at 64 (1977).
217. Id. at 65-71.
218. The Factory Inspector in his EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 209, at 66,
noted the absence of organization in explaining that the tenement workers would be unable to
force the piece price up after the depression ended.
219. Tenement-House Cigar Making in New York City, THIRTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT
OF THE NEW YORK STATE BUREAU OF LABOR FOR 1895, at 545-62 (1896). There is ample
evidence that the Cigar Makers' International Union pressed for the 1884 statute that was
found unconstitutional, as did the Tobacco Journal, the House Owners' Association of the
Tenth, Eleventh and Seventeenth Wards, the German-American Citizens' Association of the
Tenth Assembly District, the Taxpayers' Central Committee of New York, and several phy-
sicians. Id. One commentator suggested that "[it was a reproach to our legislation that such
oppression could be exerted by the power of a few trade monopolists." 31 ALB. L.J. 82, 82
(1885).
220. After Jacobs, manufacture in tenement dwellings was again prohibited, "except by
the immediate members of the family living therein." Act of May 17, 1892, ch. 655, § 1 & ch.
673, § 13, 1892 N.Y. Laws 1212. As to family workshops, the statute required that, "every
such workshop shall be kept in a cleanly state." Id. Enforcement of that provision required
the cooperation of the Factory Inspector and the Board of Health and could only be accom-
plished indirectly given Jacobs. The family working in its tenement apartment was required to
give the Board of Health the basic information it needed: "[T]he location of the workshop, the
nature of the work there carried on, and the number of persons therein employed." Act of May
17, 1892, ch. 655, § 1, 1892 N.Y. Laws 1212. Other sources were also tapped for information.
Anyone giving out uncompleted work was required to keep "a written register of the name
and addresses of all persons to whom such work is given to be made, or with whom they have
contracted to do the same." Act of Mar. 22, 1893, ch. 173, 1893 N.Y. Laws 298. Every owner
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eliminated, within this scheme, but only if the licensing require-
ments were strictly enforced.2 21 A complex choice among conflicting
values was thereby transformed into the rather more remote ques-
tion of agency funding-just as discussion of the conflicting values
that underlay constitutional choice has been transformed into a de-
bate about the relative institutional position of court and
legislature.
III. NEW CONSTRUCTION: BUILDING BEYOND CASES
The interaction between court and legislature in determining
the contours of constitutional guarantees was substantial and com-
plex-for a state, at a time, on an issue about which the assumption
of the finality of judicial choice is particularly strong. In New York,
there was neither a "fifty years massacre" '22 2 nor a "carnival of un-
constitutionality."22 Instead, between 1870 and 1920, there was
of a tenement "shall file in the Department of Health . . .the number of families occupying
each apartment, and the trades or occupations carried on therein." Act of Mar. 25, 1887, ch.
84, § 654, 1887 N.Y. Laws 94.
The Board of Health was directed to grant permits "to persons having been found wor-
thy upon inspection ... ," Act of Mar. 28, 1887, ch. 87, 1887 N.Y. Laws 103; but the family
was not required to obtain a permit. Rather, any person who had goods manufactured in
family shops that did not have a permit was a misdemeanant and subject to a fine of from $100
to $500 and imprisonment of 30 days to six months. Anyone who knowingly sold such items or
exhibited them for sale Was subject to the same penalties. Id. § 8. After 1899, the owners of
tenements were held to violate the statute unless, after notification, they "cause unlawful
manufacture to be discontinued within thirty days or faithfully prosecute proceedings for the
dispossession of the occupant." Act of Apr. 1, 1899, ch. 191, § 105, 1899 N.Y. Laws 345, 346.
Persons or firms hiring labor for work in tenements were required to obtain a permit
from the factory inspector that would indicate, from inspection, the number of persons who
might be employed. The permit might "be revoked at any time the health of the community
or of those employed therein may require it ... " Act of May 18, 1892, ch. 673, § 13, 1892
N.Y. Laws 1372, 1377.
Although the Board of Health and the Factory Inspector cooperated in policing dwell-
ing manufacture, THIRTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FACTORY INSPECTOR OF THE STATE OF
NEW YORK FOR 1898, at 785 (1899), the complexity of the scheme may have meant that home
shops were less effectively regulated than nondwelling shops until the two schemes were com-
bined by Act of Apr. 1, 1899, ch. 191, § 100, 1899 N.Y. Laws 345, 346.
Additional items of manufacture were brought into this regulatory scheme as they ap-
peared in the tenements, but Van Kleeck, supra note 208, at 1416, claimed that "[t]he licens-
ing system has not succeeded in keeping pace with the extent of home work, even in naming
the articles made in tenement homes." Id.
221. F. KELLEY, supra note 210, argued that they could not be enforced-"partial re-
strictions ...are in the nature of the case non-enforceable." Id. at 209. "By adopting these
partial prohibitions, while denying to the purchasers and the workers the protection of a com-
plete prohibition of all manufacture in the tenements, the state has instilled into the minds of
its industrially weaker citizens a sense of confusion mixed with contempt for the law." Id. at
236. See also Van Kleeck, supra note 208.
222. Cohen, supra note 28, at 245.
223. Pound, supra note 26. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
steady, rather undramatic interaction between court and legisla-
ture, with consistency in the variation of pattern and circumstance.
The judges had, not the final word, but the ability to insist that a
dialogue on constitutionality continue past the legislators' choices.
What is to be done with what I have found?
First, test the conclusions-in other states, at other times, and
in the federal courts. There is reason to believe that New York is
representative 224 and reason to test that belief. Existing work pro-
vides the basis for further studies.225
Second, develop the categories that explain what happened. The
small sample from New York is an adequate basis for raising doubts
about inquiry confined by cases and about the assumption in consti-
tutional law that the process of constitutional choice necessarily
ends when the courts oppose legislative choice. I hesitate, however,
to base elaborate explanations, much less theories, of the interaction
between court and legislature on it. Instead, having already orga-
nized the New York material by form of interaction, I want to note
three other themes that run through the same material--organiza-
tion, 226 competition, 227 and limitation by the prevailing terms of
public discourse. 228 These suggest different categories and thus dif-
ferent explanations that might be developed in further studies.
Third, use the findings. They suggest that theories might be de-
veloped that legitimate judicial choice by its involvement with,
224. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
225. See supra note 24.
226. The degree to which proponents and opponents of various solutions were orga-
nized seems to have been relevant across the categories, though with varying effect. The pro-
ponents of repeated legislation, like the National Association of Credit Men and members of
the Women's City Club, were able to get the legislation repassed when there was no effectively
organized voice in opposition. Disputes among relatively highly organized unions and em-
ployers produced constitutional amendments. Organizations such as the Association of Retail
Grocers and the Retail Clerk's Protective Association who opposed premiums and trading
stamps obtained statutes that leaders in the relevant trades approximated. Entry into certain
occupations was restricted by statute only so long as the organization that obtained the stat-
ute seemed to represent all practitioners.
227. Competition is significant in three of the categories. Concerns with effective com-
petition caused businesses to approximate the requirements of statutes governing market
practices. Restrictions on access to occupations would have limited competition within the
odcupation. The labor statutes can be thought of as attempts to limit the consequences of
competition for jobs-working longer than eight hours a day and in the face of likely injury.
228. Accepted values, common in public discourse, framed all but the labor issues. In-
terests in property were raised by both sides in arguments about the statutes that were ulti-
mately repeated. Although they disagreed on how to achieve it, both proponents and oppo-
nents of the statutes regulating market practices argued in terms of effective competition. The
effort to limit access to occupations worked so long as the claim held that the limitation pro-
moted the "public welfare." By contrast, the goals of the labor statutes could be accomplished
only with constitutional amendments resolving highly disputed values.
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rather than its separation from, legislative choice.229 These theories
might free scholarly energy for more attention to the competing val-
ues that are the subject of constitutional choice.23 ° The study sug-
gests that there are opportunities to participate in setting values
within the Constitution. The existence of interaction between court
and legislature means that constitutional choice is worked at over
time, yet often within our time, and fed by experience." 2 We need
not confine our efforts to after-the-fact review of judicial opinions
that are the final word nor to arguments about the proper limits on
the final choices of judges.
Finally, face the conflict between case-based understandings
229. G. CALABRESI, supra note 1, at 166 & n.3, argues that "dialogue [between court
and legislature to ask or force the legislature to define the old rule or reaffirm the new] is of a
piece and performs the same function in legitimating judicial power as the incremental nature
of case-by-case adjudication performed at common law."
When a focus on judicial opinion is maintained, the questions might become ones about
the symbolic aspects of judicial review-about the judicial opinion as a form of political dis-
course. Griffiths, Is Law Important? 54 N.Y.U. L. REv. 339 (1979); Leff, Law and, 87 YALE
L.J. 989, 1006-08 (1978).
230. See Parker, supra note 22; Perry, supra note 22.
231. Lawyers from the period and a current judge remind us of the possibility and
importance of participation. William Dameron Guthrie and Elihu Root cooly appraised con-
stitutional decisions from earlier in this period as they fought late in it against intense criti-
cism of the constitutional choices of the courts. Guthrie argued for "fairness and temperance
in discussing the decisions of our courts and for the imperative necessity of founding these
discussions upon the truth." Address by William Guthrie, Pennsylvania State Bar Associa-
tion, Eighteenth Annual Meeting, Cape May, N.J. (June 25, 1912), in W. GuTHRIE, MAGNA
CARTA AND OTHER ADDRESSES 69 (1916). It was clear to these two lawyers that although
judicial decisions about the constitutionality of statutes sounded like the final word, they did
not have to be the final word.
When a court of last resort has said the law is thus and so, and the law as so declared
bars the way of some popular movement, the true remedy is, not to threaten the
court with extinction or its members with punishment unless they will decide against
their convictions; but it is to set the lawmaking body in operation to change the law,
and if a majority of the people wish the law changed it will be done.
Presidential Address by Elihu Root, New York State Bar Association, Annual Meeting, New
York City (Jan. 19, 1912), in ADDRESSES ON GOVERNMENT AND CITIZENSHIP BY ELIHU ROOT
451 (R. Bacon & J. Scott eds. 1916). Their views were colored by the fact that each of these
men seem firmly to have believed that the interests of all classes could be reconciled.
Wright, Professor Bickel, The Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme Court, 84 HAEv. L.
REv. 769 (1971), after acknowledging that "constitutional adjudication may properly pro-
ceed somewhat as does common law adjudication," describes the role he sees for law
professors:
Perhaps the most important funtion of law professors, besides teaching, is to help the
courts in this creative process. If it is proper for the Court to make fundamental
value choices to protect our constitutional rights and liberties, then it is self-defeat-
ing to say that if the justices cannot come up with a perfectly reasoned general opin-
ion now, then they should abstain from decision altogether.
Id. at 778-79. Brest, supra note 7, at 1109, hopes for "citizen participation in the community's
public discourse and responsibility to shape its values and structures," but sees that as first
requiring "a genuine reconstruction of society."
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and work beyond cases. The results of this study are inconsistent
with the case-based assumptions usually brought to constitutional
law scholarship. Other studies that work beyond cases are likely to
produce similar conflicts. These conflicts can be met either by chal-
lenging the studies or by accepting the conclusions of the studies and
reconsidering case-based assumptions and the theories that inform
them. At the least neither of these alternatives ignores or avoids the
conflict. Ironically, avoiding the conflict may be made easier by the
presence in law schools of the very people who can help us work be-
yond cases. Increasingly law schools have become the academic
homes for historians, sociologists, anthropologists, psychologists,
philosophers. Because their training is "beyond cases," they consti-
tute a valuable resource for any of us moving in that direction. Ide-
ally we will learn from them and rely on them. The danger, however,
is that the need for work beyond cases will be acknowledged but left
to them on the basis of their expertise, our fear or everyone's inertia.
